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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis argues that the GIF, as an underexplored analytical vertex within the 
broader matrix of media ecologies, should be understood as a generative nodal 
point in the American system of racialized violence. Thought in relation to its 
medium specificity, the GIF’s materiality, particularly its capacity for infinite 
looping, is critically interrogated for its potential to amplify the circuitry of 
dominating racialization that felicitously condition the GIF’s circulation. I open my 
argument with focus on a subset of the GIF genre known as the reaction GIF, 
which, in its frequently racialized form, is situated within the interconnected 
genealogies of the figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and the machine. The 
reaction GIF is shown as a contemporary iteration of minstrel performance, 
known as blackface minstrelsy, that is deeply imbricated with the subordinating 
racialization of Black women. I demonstrate that the violent genealogies of 
mammy, minstrel, and machine facilitate the machinic transfiguration of Black 
women made into GIF content, a process of making-machine of the Black 
woman subject. Making-machine is the site of ontological capture the racialized 
reaction GIF institutes, and those Black women caught within its digital field 
become the inhuman iconography of the medium’s motif. To substantiate this 
account of the racializing properties of the GIF, the text engages the GIF at the 
level of its mediatic specificity and through questions of affective labor and its 
expropriation. I contend that the mediatic properties of the GIF are central to its 
modulating brokerage of affect, and it is this capacity to disperse infinitely 
differentiated affective impulses that underpins the racialized reaction GIF’s 
making-machine of Black women subjects.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BLACK OVERKILL AND ONTOLOGICAL CAPTURE IN THE DIGITAL FIELD: EXORDIA ON 
THEORY AND METHOD 
 
Ongoingly assembled and updated through a bricolage of local news 
coverage, official state administrative and law enforcement websites, social 
media reporting, and independently maintained information networks, the 
Washington Post’s “Fatal Force” was conceived in 2015 to create “a database 
cataloguing every fatal shooting nationwide by a police officer in the line of duty, 
[including] data on those who were killed and the details of the shootings.”1 The 
diversity of source material “Fatal Force” employs to document police lethality 
reflects the project’s commitment to reflexively threading porosity into the 
boundaries of its archive. An archive is intended to establish the limits of the 
epistemological, that which is knowable, and it maintains those limits through 
iterative repudiations and disavowals, separating the proper from the improper. 
“Fatal Force” refuses to congeal the walls of its archival constitution by 
maintaining a critical self-position. This impulse to resist the archive’s 
conventional disciplinarity and to favor unforeseeable porosity undergirds the 
                                               
1 “Police Shootings 2016 Database,” Fatal Force, Washington Post, accessed October 3, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/. The scope of “Fatal 
Force” is informed by the circumstances surrounding the 2014 murder of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri, a decisive moment in the development of the protest movement now known 
as Black Lives Matter and its concomitant emphasis on police accountability for unnecessary 
violence across the United States. “Fatal Force” directs its archival impulse toward those 
shootings in which an on-duty police officer shot and killed a civilian, circumstances that, per the 
Post, “most closely parallel” those of the murder of Michael Brown. “Police Shootings 2018 
Database,” Fatal Force, Washington Post, accessed October 3, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/ national/police-shootings-2018/. An examination 
of this abstracting maneuver—and what this event parallelism may occlude or distort—cannot be 
adequately addressed here. 
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epistemological status “Fatal Force” ascribes to its varied archival contents. 
Officiated digital discourses of the state are not endowed with an a priori 
objectivity that would secure those claims as beyond the field of the political and, 
as a consequence, outside the field of critique. Social media reporting, for 
example, is not disavowed as exemplifying the peculiar and subjective, a form of 
knowledge thus rendered irreconcilable with the very notion of knowledge itself. 
Its truth-value is recognized to be concomitant with those other discursive fields 
with which it may be in tension. 
Recognizing an immanent potential of change as constitutive of its 
archive’s morphology enables “Fatal Force” to provide a more accurate account 
of on-duty police officers’ application of lethal techniques than that proffered by 
the data collected by various federal agencies pursuant to legal mandate.2 As the 
Post notes and administrative officials readily acknowledge, data collected by 
federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Justice, suffer manifold 
lacunae and inconsistencies.3 Statutory restrictions on permissible data the 
difficulty of sharing information across and among governmental agencies yield a 
disconcertingly flawed picture. Moreover, whatever data have been successfully 
compiled are not released for public review with any consistency—in full 
contravention of express legal requirement that such data are published on an 
                                               
2 See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C.A § 12602(a) 
(West 2018) (“The Attorney General shall, through appropriate means, acquire data about the 
use of excessive force by law enforcement officers.”) 
3 “Police Shootings 2018 Database.” 
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annual basis.4 Insofar as the data accumulated by “Fatal Force” is publicly 
available for review and is the result of synthesizing a diverse array of source 
materials, the project stands to offer a more accurate (though still incomplete) 
account of the frequency with which police brutality occurs and the character of 
those occurrences. 
The felicitous structure of “Fatal Force” enables the articulation of 
questions that might otherwise be foreclosed by sole reliance on incomplete, 
government-generated reports. For example, what do the data compiled by 
“Fatal Force” indicate about police brutality in the United States? Against Black 
persons, more specifically?5 According to its statistics, last updated on October 1, 
                                               
4 See 34 U.S.C.A. § 12602(c) (West 2018) (“The Attorney General shall publish an annual 
summary of the data acquired under this section.”). In a 2016 report released by the 
Congressional Research Service addressing federal efforts to collect data on public trust of law 
enforcement, a review of the multiple federal programs intended to collect data on misuse of force 
by law enforcement underscored both the infrequent satisfaction of this statutory mandate and 
the inability of federal agencies to effective share and synthesize data. See Nathan James et al., 
Congressional Research Service, R43904, Public Trust and Law Enforcement: A Brief Discussion 
for Policymakers (2016), 5–8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43904.pdf. 
5 A matter of political editorial intention must be noted here. Throughout the entirety of this text, I 
have consciously rendered “Black” in the upper case. This decision follows first from my adoption 
of an ethical orientation informed by the positions of Black scholars, writers, and activists. For 
example, journalism scholar Lori L. Tharps holds that “when speaking of a culture, ethnicity or 
group of people, the name [Black] should be capitalized. Black with a capital B refers to people of 
the African diaspora. Lowercase black is simply a color.” Lori L. Tharps, “The Case for Black with 
a Capital B,” New York Times, November 19, 2014. In agreement with Tharps is Black writer and 
cultural critic Touré, who explains the rationale behind his decision to render Black in the upper 
case as follows: “I have chosen to capitalize the word ‘Black’ and lowercase ‘white’ throughout 
this book. I believe ‘Black’ constitutes a group, an ethnicity equivalent to African-American, 
Negro, or, in terms of a sense of ethnic cohesion, Irish, Polish, or Chinese.” Touré, Who’s Afraid 
of Post-Blackness? What It Means to Be Black Now (New York: Free Press, 2011), ix. I have 
chosen the locutions “Black” and “non-Black” in order to center the consequences of the 
racialized images at the heart of this analysis. In a concordant register, Catharine MacKinnon 
remarks of her writing “white” in the lower case that, “under current conditions of white 
supremacy, [‘white’] seems . . .  to require no underlining as an affirmative self-identification. 
Capitalizing both [Black and white] would also communicate an equality that is false, and would 
take no side toward making the equality a true one.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism 
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 
238n12.  
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2018, there have been at least 90 instances of unarmed Black men and women 
being shot and killed by on-duty police offers since January 1, 2015.6 Many of 
these murders, including those of Eric Harris, Walter Scott, and Keith L. Scott, 
were captured on video, either by cellphone, body camera, or dashboard 
camera, and, in the wake of their tragic deaths, these videos were disseminated 
widely across social media platforms. 
As video recordings of instances of police brutality became increasingly 
embedded in the circuitry of sociodigital media ecologies, they experienced a 
broad diffusion, one whose velocity magnified breathlessly by exploiting the ease 
of translation across social media platforms. While the omnipresent barrage of 
these recordings certainly did much work to galvanize a coordinated public 
response to the long history of police officers’ misuse of lethal force, I would not 
limit the effects of these recordings to the necessary political critique they 
inspired. Nor would I circumscribe their consequence to the resurrection of 
memories of trauma, violence, and subjection within those Black men and 
women inadvertently exposed to the videos’ contents through platforms like 
Facebook or Twitter, which typically enable automatic playback of movement-
image content as a default setting.7 These videos might also be understood, I 
                                               
6 This figure was calculated by filtering the “Fatal Force” data available for download through two 
metrics: “Armed” (for which “unarmed” was selected) and “Race” (for which “B,” standing for 
Black, was selected). The data compiled by the project is available for public download under a 
Creative Commons license and may be found on the Washington Post’s GitHub webpage, 
available here: https://github.com/washingtonpost/data-police-shootings. 
7 My use of “movement-image” throughout this discussion endeavors a twofold signification. First, 
the movement-image is that which fundamentally contrasts with a static image. Under this 
(admittedly reductive) schema, a photograph would be classified as a static image, while a 
cinematic or television scene would be regarded as a movement-image. Second, the movement-
image is that which Gilles Deleuze argues is “strictly the same” as “flowing matter,” such that the 
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would contend, as participating in a gradual transformation of contemporary 
temporal orders, one through which the violent system of American racialization 
locates a condition of its felicity.  
In an ostensibly divergent register, Jonathan Crary advances an 
interpretation of the radical transformation of present-day temporality as 
indissociably linked to the internecine injunctions of global neoliberal capital. He 
describes the temporal fold of (post)modernity as “a time without time, a time 
extracted from any material or identifiable demarcations, a time without sequence 
or recurrence.”8 For Crary, time has become fully coextensive with the meaning 
of impossibility, whereby one unwittingly acquiesces to “a simulated release from 
the hindrances of being alive which are incompatible with circulation and 
exchangeability.”9 The temporality of the present is an atemporality, a not-time 
that admits of neither past nor present nor future, the irruption of the Real into the 
conscious of everyday worldmaking and the crystallized guarantor of humanity’s 
end.   
                                               
meaning of “image” must be recognized as equivalent to the meaning of “movement.” Although 
Deleuze never explicitly provides a succinct conceptual account of the movement-image, his 
descriptions of those scenes and films he takes to be formalistically organized around the 
movement-image genre share certain attributes: formal representations of space and time, 
regulation by discrete sensory-motor functions, and the presumption of teleological, progressive, 
linear time. Movement-images proceed from a temporal point of “origin” to a temporal point of 
“conclusion.” They mirror modernist investments in Cartesian spatiotemporality. And, their 
purpose is to reflect the kinetic movement of bodies in space-time, such that it becomes 
exceedingly difficult to separate the movements of subject’s own body from the movements 
depicted in the image; matter flows between these body-images and among them, without 
perceptible discontinuity. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 58–59.  
8 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (New York: Verso, 2013), 29. 
9 Ibid., 104–5. 
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Although I am sympathetic to Crary’s intended intervention, I would 
nevertheless note the following: Crary’s description of the contemporaneous 
present as without time, sequence, or recurrence is, I believe, in tension with his 
description of the subject who lives within its temporal decree. Crary contends 
that the subject living in an era of neoliberal global capital—that is, the living of a 
certain Western subject, one who occupies a certain position within the West’s 
myriad social worlds, a distinction not altogether clear in Crary’s formulation—
must (self-)dissolve into a binarized digital algorithm if she is to properly function 
within capital’s networks of circulation and exchange. Such is the subject of the 
world under neoliberal capital, a subject who, so posited, represents less 
embodiment in its multiple specificities and more the site of inadvertent 
catachresis. Indeed, contrary to the sweeping conceptual thesis Crary proffers, 
the conditions of the unfolding present that conduct the dissolution of the 
subjects subordinated to neoliberal imperatives, as well as the positions occupied 
by those subjects who are differentially subordinated to such imperatives, must 
be hailed as neither uniform nor universal. An analysis of the unfolding present 
which proceeds from a conceptual axiomatic regarding the former as “a time 
without time” founders, I would argue, at the moment of its utterance. This is 
because there can be no univocal, singular “time” to which all subjects and 
worlds are bound; there is no single act of disaggregation which irreparably and 
monolithically dissolves “the subject” into capital’s flows. Rather, what must be 
envisioned is an burgeoning multiplicity of temporal planes whose operations are 
neither fully discordant nor fully concordant. Their work is uneven, accretive, 
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disbanding, upending, calcifying, and proliferating, a matrix whose radial 
expansion signifies the multitude of presents a subject may inhabit as well as the 
ultimate impossibility of clearly demarcating between past, present, and future.  
This is not to deny, however, Crary’s illuminating insight into the mode of 
compulsory dissolution the subject experiences upon injection into the flows of 
global capital. Rather than emphasize the subject who is both singular and 
universal, I would alternatively propose that what is exposed to dissolution are 
the fractured subjectivities loosely constitutive of the subject as we conceive it—
those artificially conjoined, immanently fragile, and always incomplete elements 
whose psychic-corporeal integration endeavors to make legible the signifying 
work of the term “personhood.” The subject-qua-person may indeed be forced to 
fracture what she perceives as her composite being at the dominating will of 
capital, but it does not follow that the temporal character of this submission is that 
of “a time without time.” Injection into the flow of capital may instead place her in 
an infinitely recurring series of relations all differentially animated by capital’s 
exploitative logic. Capital’s circuitry, its Nietzschean promise of an infinitely 
recurring transformation and return of labor-value into product and profit and 
back into alienating labor again, will not be, under such conditions, a time without 
sequence or repetition. For the subject exposed to its impossible precarity, the 
temporality of capital will be its temporalities, its many times and their 
irreducibility to one another.  
Said otherwise, we might otherwise envision the time of the 
contemporaneous present simultaneously as the temporality captured by 
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capital’s expropriation of labor, asymptotically approaching a temporal flow 
outside any phenomenological experience thereof, and, pivoted toward an 
instance of particularity, as the temporalities codified by the repeated refrain of 
police brutality and its endless display on social media platforms. To situate 
these temporal orders as overlapping fields does not require disavowing the 
imperiling tendencies of structural recurrence, here exemplified by capital and by 
repeating videos of the murder of Black men and women. Their overlap, insofar 
as they both function through differential processes of constitutive abstraction, 
can be critically mined and analytically concretized by repeatedly centering their 
connections to the material violence that accompanies quotidian worldmaking. 
Contra Crary, then, the possibility that time may be caught in an abstracting loop, 
that this loop may augur the horrors of infinite repetition without necessarily 
embracing that structural infinitude may gesture toward an imperceptibly 
extending, protean ecology of power relations whose roots have taken hold in 
unusual and putatively contradictory ways.10   
In the domain of new media, the automaticity of playback and the infinite 
loop are considered characteristic of the digital-image file known as the Graphics 
Interchange Format, or GIF, which, due to its surging social and cultural 
popularity, is now considered “an essential part of the digital lexicon.”11 Broadly 
                                               
10 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the GIF and the 24/7 temporality 
Crary deems fundamental to contemporary capitalist cultures, as well as one that both coheres 
with and departs from my own thinking on Crary’s provocations, see David Bering-Porter, “The 
Automaton in All of Us: GIFs, Cinemagraphs, and the Films of Martin Arnold,” Moving Image 
Review & Art Journal 3, no. 2 (2014). 
11 Richard Yao, “The Surging Popularity of GIFs in Digital Culture,” IPG Media Lab, Medium, April 
5, 2018, https://medium.com/ipg-media-lab/the-enduring-popularity-of-gifs-in-digital-culture-
54763d7754aa. 
 
9 
described, a GIF is a self-contained, animated image sequence that endlessly 
repeats its delimited content. The GIF, now a frequent aspect of contemporary 
digital talk, offers a mode of communication more rooted in the cultural and 
dynamically visual than conventionally textual modes. What marks the GIF as 
unique among varied digital-image formats is its capacity to store and transmit 
repeating animated sequences without depending on the usual hardware 
burdens associated with the transmission of video files. The content of an 
animated GIF is known as a “looping sequence,” which, per Kate M. Miltner and 
Tim Highfield, has the technical capacity to display “multiple frames on repeat 
[stored] within the same image file without [requiring] the size (or resolution) of a 
video [to play].”12 After it has been shared, either via a text-messaging application 
or on a social media platform, the GIF will continue its circular cinematic as long 
as it is within the visible interface boundaries of a user’s device (e.g., an iPhone, 
a laptop, etc.).  
The popularity of GIFs in digital communication has resulted in a variety of 
patterns of usage, content creation, and cultural critique—as well as patterns of 
violence, appropriation, and cultural denigration. An article written in August 2017 
by freelance journalist and doctoral student Lauren Michele Jackson, entitled 
“We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” comments on one 
such pattern, the disproportionate use of looping images of Black men and 
women as GIF content, which enables the production and permissibility of what 
                                               
12 Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing the Cultural 
Significance of the Animated GIF,” Social Media + Society 3, no. 3 (2017): 3. 
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Jackson calls “digital blackface.”13 GIFs become the mode through which 
caricatures of Black persons can proliferate in abundance, with the concordant 
dehumanization such caricatures secure obscured by the allegedly innocuous 
contexts of these GIFs’ circulation. 
GIFs and the purposes of their circulation may, at first blush, appear 
situated in a field of emergence vastly disparate from that of police brutality 
footage disseminated on social media platforms. Arguing otherwise, I would 
contend that these two modes of mediatic expression are not at all dissociable. 
Rather, the ontological violence police brutality footage indexes might be 
understood as conditioned by a process through which Black men and women 
are evacuated of any claim to a shared status of “human” and transformed into a 
machinic objecthood—a process subtended and reproduced by the circulation of 
racialized reaction GIFs. The infinite looping of Black bodies caught in the 
extractive cycling of the GIF mobilizes that repetition to heighten the racist 
production of minstrelized and mammified scenes while that same automaticity 
transforms the Black body into an uncanny figure, a machine that executes its 
program in loop and therefore cannot claim the ontological status of human.  
Among the critiques intimated by the galvanizing political imperative 
“Hands Up, Don’t Shoot!” is a recognition of the state’s capacity for racializing 
discipline and the biopolitical production of concurrently docile and dangerous 
Black bodies. “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot!” signifies the comportment of a mortal 
                                               
13 Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” Teen 
Vogue, August 2, 2017, https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs. 
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injunction to instantaneously detach from the coordinates of the Black bodily 
frame. It unabashedly accents that submission to its injunction is a necessary, 
though by no means sufficient, condition of survival for any Black person forcibly 
thrust into the crosshairs of the state’s violent policing apparatus. What is the 
consequence of this disciplinary regime when its mandates always already 
undergird an encounter with police brutality? One might consider the footage of 
Keith Lamont Scott’s murder, which was recorded by his wife, Rakeiya Scott, 
who documented the scene with a stability of frame likely unintelligible to those 
beyond the state’s racializing vice grip on Black lives.14 One might examine the 
cellphone footage of the murder of North Charleston, South Carolina, resident 
Walter Scott, taken by community member Feidin Santana.15 Santana tracks the 
scene coolly and slowly—even after an officer emitted a barrage of gunfire into 
Scott’s back. Santana’s grip remains steady, almost detached; one might even 
describe as machine-like. 
The making-machine of Black men and women—as well as of persons of 
color more generally, Indigenous Americans, trans persons, and numerous 
others whose bodily legibility incites a cascade of violent social disqualification—
is part and parcel of the ongoing process of racialization that constitutes Black 
subjects as necessary sites of violence, encouraged and effected by state and 
                                               
14 See “Charlotte Shooting Video: Footage Shows Fatal Encounter Between Police, Keith Lamont 
Scott,” U.S. News, NBC News, last updated September 23, 2016, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/charlotte-shooting-video-footage-shows-fatal-
encounter-between-police-keith-n653426. 
15 See “Video Shows Fatal Police Shooting,” Times Video: Race in America, New York Times, 
April 7, 2015, https://nyti.ms/1yTnTsi. 
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individual alike. GIFs whose intelligibility depends on the modality of digital 
blackface Jackson identifies situate Black bodies in an infinite loop of affective 
extraction and dehumanizing labor; the repetition of the movement-image that is 
a GIF’s content forces the Black body to veer toward the position of the uncanny, 
of the not-human. This position of not-human is as much the enabling condition 
of police brutality against unarmed Black men and women as it is the disciplinary 
injunction to which Black individuals most submit their bodies if they are to 
survive the exacting violence of a racializing state.  
This thesis will argue that the GIF, as an underexplored analytical vertex 
within the broader matrix of media ecologies, should be understood as a 
generative nodal point in the American system of racialized violence. Thought of 
in the terms of the medium, the GIF’s specific materialities, its capacity for infinite 
looping or the discourse of discretely compressed filed in which that loop is 
stored, must be critically interrogated for their potential to amplify the circuitry of 
dominating racialization that felicitously condition the GIF’s circulation. As a site 
for the exchange, modulation, and brokerage of affect, the GIF has an influential 
role in the economies of affect transited through media infrastructures. The 
inability to foresee the content of the GIFs to which a subject may be 
inadvertently exposed suggests that, under certain conditions, the experience of 
unexpectedly encountering a symbolically GIF may elicit reactions at the most 
deeply bodily level. To respond to, maintain, combat, and address these bodily 
excitations is to perform labor in its affective form. That affective labor is always 
already performed in a context of racialization, and that this racialization may be 
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vertiginously magnified by a GIF’s racist content, encourage an examination of 
the GIF’s capacity to extract and expropriate the affective labor of its unwitting 
conscripts.  
The GIF will thus be shown to underscore the relationship between the 
making-machine of Black bodies and the telos of American racism, the subjection 
of those bodies to overkill. In his powerful meditation on the grotesque killings of 
several queer youth across the United States, Stanley offers the notion of overkill 
to bring into signification that which would seem to defy it, the capacity of 
“excessive violence . . . [to push] a body beyond death.”16 Overkill is, for Stanley, 
an analytic necessary to understand the gruesome murders of Lauryn Paige, 
who was partially decapitated, and Rashawn Brazell, whose body was dissected 
after he was murdered, because it locates this violence of overkill “precisely not 
outside of, but [as] that which constitutes liberal democracy as such.”17 Overkill is 
the violence that affirms the non-violence of liberal democratic equality; it codes 
the necessity of sameness over difference and submission over resistance.  
Thinking together the notion of overkill and the question of time, Stanley 
argues that overkill indexes, symbolically and materially, a “temporality of 
violence” altogether particular to its operation: “[The] biological time when the 
heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished . . . [this 
concurrence] suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the 
                                               
16 Eric Stanley, “Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 29, no. 2 
(2011): 9. 
17 Ibid., 10. 
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ending of all [differentially marked] life.”18 This move to end all differentially 
marked life establishes the vicious force of “ontological capture,” a “space of 
nonexistence . . . forged in the territory of inescapable violence . . . [which] 
crystallizes the ontocorporeal, discursive, and material inscriptions that render 
specific bodies in specific times as the place of the nothing.”19 It is this 
reconfiguration of subjective specificity and particularity into a vast abyss of 
nothing—an abyss of eternal sameness, endless repetition, a time that is not 
time—that is at stake in the dissemination of GIFs produced through a logic of 
digital minstrelsy. 
My argument unfolds across the next three chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
suggest that a deeper analytical avenue is opened by following Jackson’s 
observation that GIFs of Black women are often the particular focus of the digital 
minstrelsy she documents. I expand her critique by locating the proliferation of 
GIFs caricaturing Black women within a broader social constellation underpinned 
by logics of mammification, minstrelsy and making-machine. To do so, I turn to 
the varied histories of the mammy figure as they relate to the practice of 
blackface performance. I then offer an extensive engagement with the question 
of the constitutive relationship between the figure of the minstrel and that of the 
machine.  
I then turn to an analysis of the GIF as a mediatic form in Chapter 3, 
sketching out paradigms common in its critical appraisal as a digital media object 
                                               
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Ibid., 14. 
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and querying their possibilities and deficiencies. I focus my own analysis of the 
GIF on the question of the loop, which I consider one of the fundamental aspects 
of the GIF’s medium specificity and a key element of its constitutive work. I argue 
that by tracing the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs the violent logic of 
transforming Black subjects into machinic figurations can be rendered visible. 
This process, what I call making-machine, is one that strips them of their 
subjective particularity as it deploys them in an economy of racialization that 
operates through dehumanization.  
Making-machine is the site of ontological capture the racialized reaction 
GIF institutes, and those Black subjects caught within its digital field become the 
inhuman iconography of digital media creation. To substantiate this account of 
the racializing properties of the GIF, I engage the image at the level of its 
mediatic specificity and through questions of affective labor and its expropriation. 
I contend that the mediatic properties of the GIF are central to its modulating 
brokerage of affect, and it is this capacity to disperse infinitely differentiated 
affective impulses that underpins the racialized reaction GIF’s making-machine of 
Black women. The logic of making-machine is part of the core technologies of 
racialized exclusion and violence. Its process is both a condition for the survival 
of Black lives and the disciplinary technique that guarantees their exposure to 
material and ontological violence. Making-machine, then, is situated in 
irreconcilable relation to the process of making-human; the former 
simultaneously affirms and negates the latter.  
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To be certain, I am speaking about a particular context of GIF circulation 
in the argument I propose. Following Jackson’s analytical lead, I emphasize the 
(de)subjectifying work done by the GIF when it is circulated in one of its most 
casual, putatively spontaneous scenes: that of the text-message exchange via 
cellphone. Moreover, I am interested in directing my argument toward the explicit 
relationship between the GIF, the casualness associated with its circulation, the 
frequency with which its content implicates digital blackface, and the fortification 
of white supremacist social mores. My discussion therefore narrows its 
interrogative scope to the scene of GIF exchange between two non-Black 
cellphone users—more specifically, between two white cellphone users. In the 
text that follows, this context—the circulation of a GIF whose content implicates 
racializing and violently racist caricature between two white persons—orients my 
analytical efforts as their backdrop. Unless stated otherwise, this is the context 
through which my analysis proceeds, and instances in which the racially 
subordinating consequences of certain GIFs’ circulation are discussed take this 
context as their referent. 
Finally, it is to the specificity of the process of making-machine that I 
return in Chapter 4, transposing these abstracted analytics onto the register of 
the concrete in my discussion of a widely circulated GIF featuring Linnethia 
Monique “NeNe” Leakes, a member of the cast of popular reality television show 
The Real Housewives of Atlanta. Chapter 4 weaves together the historicized 
braids of Chapter 2 with the theoretical propositions of Chapter 3; that is, it is an 
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effort to carefully thread the concrete through the abstract and the abstract 
through the concrete in a recursive, mutually formative mode.  
Admittedly, the conclusions tentatively drawn in my consideration of one of 
the most popular GIFs featuring Leakes will inevitably fail to fully account for 
either the concrete or the abstract in their most robust forms. This is one 
consequence of a methodological commitment to the maintenance of a 
dialectical relation in its most taut coordinates, which refuses to submit to a 
synthesis that would dissolve the vital differences between the conceptual 
account of the GIF I have developed that account’s distinctive relevance to (and 
insufficiency for) an analysis of Leakes’ coerced submission to the process of 
making-machine. Instead, my hope is that this meditation on the question of 
racialized reaction GIFs and the particularity of Leakes’ appropriation as those 
GIFs’ content can be read through and against one another, pressing the 
epistemological boundaries of the conceptual and the particular to their most 
productive limits.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTERLOCKING GENEALOGIES: THE MAMMY, THE MINSTREL, THE MACHINE, AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF DIGITAL BLACKFACE THROUGH THE REACTION GIF 
 
 In early August 2017, freelance journalist and doctoral student Lauren 
Michele Jackson published “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction 
GIFs” (“Digital Blackface”), an article which critically appraises the 
disproportionate use (and misuse) of looping movement-images of Black men 
and women as GIF content.1 Jackson perceives beyond the common refrain that 
“digital behavior [as frivolous as GIF exchange] exists in a deracialized vacuum” 
a failure to recognize the role of the hyperbolically racialized GIF in the 
(re)production of “digital blackface.”2 The transfiguration of nineteenth-century 
minstrel performance into a disembodying, byte-governed algorithm of re-
racialization, digital blackface describes “various types of minstrel performance 
that become available in cyberspace . . . [by exploiting] the relative anonymity of 
online identity to embody [B]lackness.”3 Historically, minstrel performance has 
adopted racist caricatures and turned to histrionic, racist modes of theatrical 
presentation to “put society’s most racist sensibilities on display and [feed] them 
back to audiences to intensify these [racist sentiments] and disperse them across 
cultures.”4  
                                               
1 Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” Teen 
Vogue, August 2, 2017, https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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While prior histories of minstrelsy worked through material embodiment 
and a false logic of mimesis, digital blackface arguably operates through a more 
seamless and inconspicuous transformation. To assume a fictive identity through 
the practice of digital blackface is, as Jackson documents, a disturbingly common 
phenomenon. Often coincident with the assumption of this fictive, racially marked 
persona is an “excessive use of reaction GIFs with images of [B]lack people,” 
which Jackson implicates as a mechanism integrated into the broader enterprise 
of convincing digital audiences that the online identity bears an authentic, “real-
world” counterpart in the form of an individual.5 Even in situations that do not 
involve the construction and maintenance of a fabricated persona, the 
tremendous velocity of mediatic exchange through online platforms structures a 
circuitry of nearly instantaneous dialectical movement between the assumption 
and refutation of Black identities. Equally paramount has been the integration of 
GIFs into text-messaging applications, which has provided users with 
unprecedented levels of access to such looping images and control over the 
contexts of their deployment.  
The broad object of Jackson’s analysis—the GIF—is not without its own 
histories, of course. Moreover, the specific materiality of the GIF, the 
“particularities of [its] mode of transmission, processing, and storage,” are 
inescapably political and inseparable from histories of the image’s development 
and deployment.6 The social, political, and historical contexts within which new 
                                               
5 Ibid. 
6 Jussi Parikka, What Is Media Archaeology? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 36. 
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media forms emerge are conditioned by as well as condition, argues Jussi 
Parikka, those “non-human elements which are integral to what constitutes” the 
fields of modernity.7 Necessary, then, is a brief detour into the histories of the 
GIF, differentiated contexts that will better illuminate the questions Jackson 
investigates and, extending her analysis, I will pose.  
Known fully as the Graphics Interchange Format, the GIF was first 
developed in 1987 to facilitate the compression and transmission of static images 
across low-speed Internet connections. Differentiating the GIF from other 
common image formats such as the TIFF (Tagged Image File Format) or the 
PNG (Portable Network Graphics) has long been its capacity to display a self-
contained animated scene on potentially endless repeat.8 Because of this 
capacity for repetition, the content of animated GIFs is often referred to as a 
“looping sequence.” The looping sequence, enabled by the GIF’s specific 
technical structure, can successfully display “multiple frames on repeat [that are 
stored] within the same image file without [requiring] the size (or resolution) of a 
video [to play].”9 The animated GIF can be understood, in other words, as an 
image file designed to sequentially encode multiple frames that, upon their 
display, would run those frames “in order to make a moving image . . . through 
                                               
7 Ibid., 63 
8 As James Ash usefully reminds us, the GIF’s technical structure enables it to display both static 
images and animated sequences; it was the GIF’s capacity to display moving animation, 
however, that galvanized its popularity, relegating its static-image capabilities inconsequential if 
not fully effaced in broader social imaginaries. See James Ash, “Sensation, Networks, and the 
GIF: Toward an Allotropic Account of Affect,” in Networked Affect, ed. Ken Hillis, Susanna 
Paasonen, and Michael Pettit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 119.  
9 Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing the Cultural 
Significance of the Animated GIF,” Social Media + Society 3, no. 3 (2017): 3. 
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flip-book style animation.”10 The GIF’s storage capacity made it ideal for 
transmitting and embedding cinematic visual content, albeit of short duration, in a 
technological moment of comparatively limited bandwidth and underdeveloped 
video-editing software.11 Unlike video files, GIFs cannot support audio 
transmission in addition to the looping movement-image sequence; no sound is 
attached to the looping scene. As a consequence, it has become common 
practice to append text to the bottom of GIF’s image-area; this text is, more often 
than not, a transcription of what is said by the individuals who constitute the 
GIF’s content.  
The immediate popularity the GIF attained as a result of its utility in the 
late 1980s was followed by a period of intensely contrasting absence. It would 
not be until the mid-2000s, with the advent of websites such as MySpace, 
LiveJournal, and Tumblr, that the pendulum of the GIF’s popularity would again 
swing. The individualized customizability these new Internet platforms offered 
users rekindled the GIF’s desirability, as the image’s small size, spectacular 
content, and ease of use were ideal complements to these platforms’ ethos.12 
The resurgence of the GIF was not simply a matter of these individuated 
web platforms extending a digitally hospitable hand to the image. In their reading 
of the GIF’s shifting horizons of popularity, Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield 
suggest that the image’s return to visibility was profoundly aided “by the nostalgic 
                                               
10 David Bering-Porter, “The Automaton in All of Us: GIFs, Cinemagraphs, and the Films of Martin 
Arnold,” Moving Image Review & Art Journal 3, no. 2 (2014): 183. 
11 Miltner and Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up,” 3. 
12 Ibid. 
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proclivity of Internet culture groups for the banalities of the early web: dial-up 
modems, cheesy Web 1.0 design, and 8-bit pixilation.” Articulations of the GIF as 
integral to the “‘Internet Ugly’ aesthetic beloved by early users of the Internet” 
and as the “file format of the Internet generation . . . our vinyl, our compact disk” 
encourage an interpretation of the GIF as one of the many technological 
junctures at which Marxism and Freudianism can be said to intersect.13 Marx’s 
observation that capitalism demands an endless procurement of ever-expanding 
volumes of resources exemplifies a kind of Oedipalized lust of a Freudian ilk; that 
which semiotically codes the “better” as the “new” cannot orient its teleologically 
progressive desire for new modes of consumption without rooting itself in the 
binaristic flip that codes the “worse” as the “old.” The compact file size of the GIF 
enables it to support a variety of looping movement-images and complementary 
snippets of text. Although this looping sequence of mediatic information is filtered 
through the contextual sieve of the new—the GIF no longer inhabits MySpace or 
LiveJournal but iMessage, Twitter, and Facebook—it is the GIF’s “primitive” 
design that secures the continued possibility of its image-information economy.   
 
Considering the Critique of “Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs” 
Having introduced the major thematics of Jackson’s argument and 
provided a contextualizing history of the object of her analysis, I would like to 
pause here in order to recount in more exacting detail my interpretation of 
                                               
13 Ibid.; Lance Ulanoff, “The Secret History of the GIF,” Tech, Mashable, August 10, 2016, 
https://mashable.com/2016/08/10/history-of-the-gif/#E5kPvavEuOqU. 
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Jackson’s argument, that is, what I understand to be the specific phenomena her 
text exhumes and the relations shared by those phenomena. Jackson’s 
discussion of digital minstrelsy is, I believe, intended to address at least two 
intertwined and, thus, co-emergent processes of racialization-cum-subordination. 
The first is the assumption of a fictional online identity that congeals through its 
recourse to American histories of minstrel performance writ large; to substantiate 
the real-world legitimacy of such an identity, an individual—almost always, a non-
Black individual—deploys reaction GIFs whose content is interpreted to signify a 
hyperbolic moment of racialized performance.  
The reaction GIF, a subset of the GIF genre, is specifically named by 
Jackson and demonstrated to be emblematic of the racializing work of which the 
GIF is capable. Reaction GIFs are, like GIFs as an image category, infinitely 
looping scenes; what merits the qualifier “reaction” is this subset’s frequent 
representation of “bodies in motion, primarily excerpted from recognizable pop 
culture moments . . . [and often] used to express common ideas and emotions.”14 
Although the interpersonal intelligibility of a reaction GIF is determined at least by 
the context of its transmission,15 as well as by an individual’s relative familiarity 
with the cultural references through which the GIF legibly signifies,16 the reaction 
                                               
14 Jason Eppink, “The Reaction GIF: Moving Image as Gesture,” Spring Installation Catalogue, 
Museum of the Moving Image, last accessed October 5, 2018, 
http://www.movingimage.us/exhibitions/2014/03/12/detail/the-reaction-gif-moving-image-as-
gesture/.  
15 That is, the social backdrop formative of the communicative field in which the GIF is invoked, a 
question of whether the GIF as such, as well as the purpose of its transmission, would be 
recognizable in an instance of its exchange. 
16 That is, the recognition of the cultural sign the GIF heralds and differentially mimes through its 
deployment, such as a widely recognized scene from a popular television program or a brief clip 
of a known character from a film. 
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GIF has been consistently hailed as among the most discursively potent of the 
image’s forms. According to Jason Eppink, the Associate Curator of Digital Media 
at the New York City Museum of the Moving Image, reaction GIFs are uniquely 
able to “communicate more nuance and concision than their verbal 
translations.”17 Rephrased within the register of Jackson’s argument, reaction 
GIFs’ easy modulation of verbal lexicons imbues them with a signifying flexibility 
and gestural potency; these images can heighten the violence of racialization 
and disavow their complicity with such a system in a selfsame instantaneous 
moment. Correspondingly, appeals to such reaction GIFs, as the logic of digital 
minstrelsy in its individuated form would suggest, consolidate the authenticity of 
the fictive identity, extinguishing suspicions of misrepresentation by marking the 
content of the GIF and the content of the digital identity as substantively 
metonymic.  
The second practice, which is indissociably bound to the first insofar as 
each is reciprocally generative of the other, is the casual deployment of GIFs, 
primarily through cellphone text-messaging systems, whose content is almost 
exclusively Black faces to communicate responsorial hyperbole—hyperbole that 
is indelibly constituted by and through racist tropes of minstrel performance and 
“our cultural propensity [to] see [B]lack people as walking hyperbole.”18 Jackson 
is unambiguous about her turn to this structural level of personal-impersonal 
practice and its requisite differentiation from atomistic events of digital minstrelsy:  
                                               
17 Eppink, “The Reaction GIF.” 
18 Jackson, “Digital Blackface in GIFs.” 
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If there’s one thing the Internet thrives on, it’s hyperbole, and the 
overrepresentation of [B]lack people GIFing everyone’s daily crises plays 
up enduring perceptions and stereotypes about [B]lack express. And when 
[non-Black] users flock to these images, they are playacting within those 
stereotypes in a manner reminiscent of an unsavory American tradition. 
Reaction GIFs are mostly frivolous and fun. But when [B]lack people are 
the go-to choice for [non-Black] users to act out their most hyperbolic 
emotions, do reaction GIFs become “digital blackface”?19 
       
As a critical hermeneutic, digital blackface does not address the thorny 
problematic of intention; rather, as Jackson plainly expounds, it telescopes with 
necessary precision the violent act of inhabiting a Black persona. It is thus no 
surprise that among the most popular search terms for reaction GIFs are “generic 
search[es] like ‘funny [B]lack kid [GIF]’ or ‘[B]lack lady [GIF].’”20  
In a further exposure of the racializing algorithmic logic that governs GIF-
hosting websites, Jackson notes that when the latter phrase—“[B]lack lady 
[GIF]”—is queried within the search engine available on Giphy, a popular online 
GIF repository, the website “offers several additional suggestions, such as ‘Sassy 
Black Lady,’ ‘Angry Black Lady,’ and ‘Black Fat Lady’ to assist users in narrowing 
down their search.”21 Set against the dizzying number of GIFs transmitted 
through online platforms daily (in 2016, for example data collected by Giphy 
indicated the Facebook Messenger users were sending approximately 25,000 
GIFs per minute through the platform; in October of that year, Giphy announced 
that its catalogue exceeded 1 billion images and that it was directly serving over 
100 million users daily), the relationship between Giphy’s algorithmic 
                                               
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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encouragement, the minstrelized racialization circuited through GIF transmission, 
and the pernicious calcification of racist tropes is made newly visible.22 These 
interconnected processes are able to fold into one another and mutually subsist 
through their internal differentiation and adaptation to the evolving contexts of 
racialization. This folding inward, however, is complemented and augmented a 
collective folding outward, whereby each racializing formation functions to 
subtend the omnipresent and socially saturating system of racial hierarchy 
characteristic of the United States’ social order.  
How, then, to think the ramifications of racialized reaction GIFs 
transversally, thereby bridging the structural and the capillary without diminishing 
or distorting either? An interesting, as well as symbolic, method can be culled by 
reading synthetically the propositions that respectively inaugurate and conclude 
Jackson’s meditation. Opening her article with a remark on GIFs’ undeniable 
presence within the social worlds of the Internet, Jackson then indexes the 
curious representational field that will be the subject of her critique: “But even a 
casual observer of GIFing would notice that, as with much of online culture, 
[B]lack people appear at the center of it all. Or images of [B]lack people, at 
                                               
22 Giphy, “New on Giphy: GIF View Counts,” Medium, August 28, 2017, 
https://medium.com/@giphy/introducing-gif-view-counts-e3ec1899e7bd; Miltner and Highfield, 
“Never Gonna GIF You Up,” 4. Notably, of the three GIFs included in static-image form on their 
first page of Miltner and Highfield’s article, one is of NeNe Leakes, whose iterative “GIFification” is 
the subject of my later discussion. The two offer the following hypothetical narration of the 
image’s use: “Whether . . .  texting a reaction GIF of NeNe Leakes from The Real Housewives of 
Atlanta . . . the GIF is a remarkably dexterous, malleable, and versatile file format that is central to 
digital cultures and communication.” Ibid. Only the GIF of Leakes is specifically designated a 
“reaction GIF,” with the first image of the trio not even directly described as an image (a GIF of 
Hillary Clinton) and the third characterized as a remixed clip. 
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least.”23 As she approaches the conclusion of her argument, however, the 
undifferentiated sociality of “online culture” is filtered through an optics of 
particularity, one informed by histrionic performances so often transformed into 
the content of reaction GIFs: “Ultimately, [B]lack people and [B]lack images are 
thus relied upon to perform a huge amount of emotional labor online on behalf of 
[non-Black] users. . . . Intertwine this proliferation of our images with the others 
we’re as likely to see—death, looped over and over—and the Internet becomes 
an exhausting experience.”24 Situated in immediate dialectical relation to one 
another, these statements locate the racializing force of the GIF at the level of 
techno-material, affective precision and at the register of an epistemologically 
aspirational approach to totality in the form of Internet culture.25 The GIF thus 
becomes a molecular instance of racializing subordination whose efficacy is 
conditioned by a molar social order of racism. 
The purpose of Jackson’s intervention is, broadly described, diagnostic 
and prescriptive. Recognizing the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs within 
larger constellations of racist economies, Jackson questions why the use of GIFs 
featuring Black men or women in decontextualized, caricatured representations 
can feel so seemingly intuitive and innocuous. Her concern is with the 
                                               
23 Jackson, “Digital Blackface in GIFs.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 The notion of an “epistemologically aspirational approach to totality” is drawn from Kevin 
Floyd’s The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism. Floyd contends that the 
methodological promise of this aspirational mode is contained in its approach to the universal 
“from the vantage of a specific location within that web of relations [i.e., within that totalizing 
structure], a vantage that necessarily abstracts that totality in coloring everything it seems, but 
also makes possible broad understandings of social reality unavailable to other perspectives.” 
Kevin Floyd, The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009), 12. 
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expectation of emotional labor onto Black persons whose momentary 
expressions—expressions often captured under situations of purposeful, rather 
than purportedly “natural,” exaggeration—are transformed into infinitely looping 
sequences to be parodied. This exportation swiftly recalibrates into exploitation, 
amplifying its already violent potentiality. By this, I mean to suggest that the 
reaction GIF of the Black subject is only able to perform this exported emotional 
labor because of a prior sociocultural logic that reads Black embodiment as 
assuredly viable content for racist theatricality; in turn, this hermeneutical racism 
performs an exportation of its own, disseminating that transformed content as 
irrefutable evidence of the “natural” excess and pathology of Black behavior. 
Extensions of the critical possibilities opened by Jackson’s text are 
promisingly numerous. Brief mention is made, for instance, of the hypervisibility 
of Black femmes and women as the content of reaction GIFs, although this 
observation is not further pursued. Its provocation, nevertheless, indexes the 
analytical potential of triangulating the imbricated processes of racialization, 
gender-sex materialization, and sexualization to more precisely interrogate the 
GIF’s role in constituting the social. Another suspended reserve of critical 
potential arises at the conclusion of the text with Jackson’s characterization of 
the reaction GIFs’ racializing work as the extraction of Black persons’ emotional 
labor. Jackson does not maintain, however, that the labor so siphoned is 
exclusively delimited by the emotional field. Accordingly, whether the character of 
this extracted labor can or should be understood in alternative and additional 
ways remains an unanswered question. 
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With this said, I would like to propose three inquiries that constructively 
respond to and extend Jackson’s analysis of the reaction GIF; these three 
questions will orient my subsequent discussion of the constitutive braiding 
between the GIF and racialization as a process of subject-formation. First, what 
logic subtends the dissemination of GIFs caricaturing and dehumanizing Black 
women and those GIFs’ cultural omnipresence? Phrased alternatively, how can 
the reaction GIF be situated within a genealogy of blackface minstrelsy, 
particularly with regard to the figure of the mammy, the enslaved Black woman 
whose status as subject is forcibly entangled with her willing submission to 
enslaving whites? It is to this question that I will respond in the remainder of this 
chapter’s discussion. Second, how does the mediatic specificity of the reaction 
GIF—the stylization of its content, its capacity for infinite repetition, its truncated 
temporality, the ease with which it can be exchanged—aid and abet an extraction 
of Black women’s affective labor? This transition from emotion to affect enables 
an analysis of the GIF’s extractive operations more attuned to the psychic, 
corporeal, and intersubjective violences of sexualized racialization and racialized 
sexualization.26 Third, how might this critical engagement with affective labor and 
                                               
26 The subjectifying field intended by the locution “sexualized racialization and racialized 
sexualization” draws upon Jasbir Puar’s influential monograph Terrorist Assemblages and her 
fertile methodological centering of “race and sexuality simultaneously in the reproduction of 
relations of living and dying.” Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer 
Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 35. Her intervention, which introduces the 
conceptual axiomatic undergirding the text, regards the relationship between the biopolitical—
Michel Foucault’s description of the modern state’s investment in cultivating and maximizing life in 
its myriad unfolding forms—and the necropolitical—Achille Mbembe’s corrective to Foucauldian 
biopolitics that attends to the state’s fostering of death and “the brutality of biopower’s incitement 
to life.” Ibid., 33. Puar identifies a methodological deficiency characteristic of present 
engagements with biopolitics: these accounts routinely foreground processes of racialization and 
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the GIF’s mediatic specificity illuminate the symbolic relations between the 
figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and the machine? That is, how does the 
circulation of racialized reaction GIFs work through the genealogical currents of 
mammification and minstrelization to conduct the making-machine of Black 
women? What are the consequences of and constraints imposed by this making-
machine for the subject interpellated as a Black woman? What becomes of her 
subjective particularity, of her capacity to recognize herself (and be recognized 
by others) as ontologically commensurate with the status of human? These latter 
two inquiries will build on the analysis presented below and will be substantively 
engaged in the discussion’s next and final chapters. 
 
Mammification, Minstrelization, and the Racializing Epistemology of the GIF 
Endearing, gruff, cantankerous, strong, spirited, fiercely independent, 
unapologetic, incisively observant—the innumerable representational forms 
demanded of GIFs of Black women bear an uneasy resonance with many of the 
attributes of an iconic figure of the antebellum South, the mammy. Is there a 
                                               
sexualization as immanent to biopolitical analysis but seldom situate the two fields as reciprocally 
constitutive and indissociably intertwined.  
Rather than continue this pattern of mutual exclusion, Puar understands racialization and 
sexualization to be coextensive technologies, and, as a result, the disaggregation of “exceptional 
queer subjects from queer racialized populations in contemporary U.S. politics” can be mapped 
onto “the tension between biopolitics and necropolitics.” Ibid., 35. The suffusion of her analytical 
optic with a concurrently operative sexual-racial regulatory script enables Puar to refuse the 
corresponding methodological maneuver that usually dislocates the biopolitical from the 
necropolitical. As Puar states, “This bio-necro collaboration conceptually acknowledges 
biopower’s direct activity in death, while remaining bound to the optimization of life, and 
necropolitics’ nonchalance toward death even as it seeks out killing as its primary aim.” Ibid. The 
imbrication of biopolitics and necropolitics that Puar proposes is intrinsic to the logic of making-
machine, which refuses to explicitly acknowledge the demarcation of Black bodies as imperative 
sites of death by proliferating the ruse that submission to the bodily inertia of machinic subjectivity 
will inoculate Black subjects against state and social violence. 
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relationship between the ascendant popularity of GIFs featuring Black women 
and the multiple legacies of the mammy, the latter of which, in its constitutive 
conductivity, might be thought as the logics of mammification?  
I want to suggest that one form of this contemporary logic of 
mammification can be seen in the frequent exchange of reaction GIFs whose 
content features Black women performing decontextualized scenes of hyperbolic 
excess. Moreover, I contend that this logic of mammification works through and 
alongside proliferations of digital minstrelsy, and that both figures—that of the 
mammy and that of the minstrel—are generatively embedded within larger 
discursive formations which braid together notions of the mammy, the minstrel, 
and the machine. Through the durative extractions of Black women’s affective 
labor maintained by the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs, a process of 
making-machine manifests, one that strips Black women of their subjective 
particularity by denying them the possibility of recognition within the ontological 
status of the human.  
 
On the Logic of Mammification. 
In her Mammy: A Century of Race, Gender, and Southern Memory, 
Kimberly Wallace-Sanders opines that “the mammy figure looms over the 
American imagination as a cultural influence so pervasive[ly] . . . because it both 
shapes and is shaped by a consciousness that is uniquely American.”27 The 
                                               
27 Kimberly Wallace-Sanders, Mammy: A Century of Race, Gender, and Southern Memory (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 9. 
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lexical presence of the term “mammy,” Wallace-Sanders ably documents, 
solidified by the mid-nineteenth century, most notably in the American South.28 
The term’s continued resonance, however, bespeaks the racializing mythos of 
which the mammy has been differentially symbolic across American space-
times.29 To better methodologically attend to the diverse histories of the mammy 
figure, Wallace-Sanders develops her analysis through a meticulously reflexive 
balancing of historical and contemporary interpretations of the mammy figure. 
The histories of American racism and their cooperative efforts with essentializing 
gender mythology are never foreclosed in the presented account. Nevertheless, 
Wallace-Sanders does not deny that any effort of historical reconstruction 
involves a displacement of present onto past and past onto present; she instead 
seeks to understand how diversely positioned reifications of the mammy figure 
have shaped American racial imaginaries both historically and in the present. 
Synthesizing the myriad descriptions of the mammy figure, Wallace-
Sanders offers the following characterization as its most recognizable iteration, 
an embodiment of extremity and exaggeration: 
Mammy’s body is grotesquely marked by excess: she is usually extremely 
overweight, very tall, broad-shouldered; her skin is nearly black. She 
manages to be a jolly presence—she often sings or tells stories while she 
works—and a strict disciplinarian at the same time. . . . Mammy is often 
both her title and the only name she has ever been given. . . . Mammy 
wields considerable authority without the plantation household and 
                                               
28 Ibid., 4. Wallace-Sanders states that the earliest documented use of the term “mammy” was in 
1810 in reference to enslaved women caring for white children. By 1820, the word was “almost 
exclusively associated with African American women serving as wet nurses and caretakers of 
white children.” Ibid. 
29 Wallace-Sanders laments the frequent siloing of the mammy figure into analytically inflexible 
categories, with the consequence of such a reductive methodological tack likely guaranteeing an 
inability to see “the mammy figure as a signpost pointing to concepts and ideals far beyond the 
stereotype.” Ibid., 3. 
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consequently retains a measure of dubious, unreliable respect in the slave 
quarters; many slaves consider her untrustworthy because she allegedly 
identifies so completely with the culture that oppresses them.30 
 
The defining psychic, corporal, and socially positional attributes Wallace-Sanders 
locates in depictions of the mammy figure have translated into the unfolding 
present in the form of a “controlling image,” what Patricia Hill Collins defines as 
an iteratively produced ideological framing of Black women “designed to make 
racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear to be natural, 
normal, and inevitable parts of [Black women’s] everyday life.”31  
For Collins, the pernicious legacy of the mammy figure is its subjectifying 
primacy as the “first controlling image” through which Black women are forcibly 
filtered and regulated.32 It is the violently maintained tenacity of this controlling 
image that ensures the continued “mammification” of Black women—their de 
facto treatment as mammy figures by white persons and the penalizing discipline 
to which they are subjected should they fail to appear deferential to and nurturing 
of elite whites.33 Collins’ magisterial explication of the interwoven ubiquity of the 
mammy figure across American social, cultural, and political registers 
unflinchingly illustrates the figure’s symbolic function in maintenance of American 
racism and racialization. She identifies the mammy figure as a generative nexus 
for the reproduction of racialized sexuality and sexualized racism, and it is by 
                                               
30 Ibid., 5–6. 
31 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1990), 69. 
32 Ibid., 72 
33 Ibid., 73. 
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implicating these multiple sites of social disqualification that the mammy figure 
can continue to exercise its disciplinary power as a controlling image.  
Following these analyses, the logic of mammification may be understood 
as exhibiting several different tenets, with the relentless injunction that Black 
women position themselves in service to non-Black persons as especially 
axiomatic. This logic contends that through such service and self-sacrifice (the 
latter of which manifests as coerced self-debasement) the mammified Black 
woman will experience a serene joy and satisfaction. It is necessary to note, 
however, that the logic of mammification is not per se coextensive with the 
symbolic operations of the mammy figure. Although the mammy image cannot 
and does not fully determine Black women’s behavior, it effects an indelible 
impression on Black women’s bodies, akin to what Hortense Spillers has named 
a “hieroglyphics of the flesh.”34  
The logic of mammification I am proposing cannot be advanced outside its 
own historicity; to intertwine the mammy figure with the exchange of GIFs of 
Black women by non-Black persons requires parsing out the genealogical 
histories of practices involving the performance of Blackness and, specifically, of 
Black womanhood.35 To this end, the historiographical work of Micki McElya is 
especially valuable. In Clinging to Mammy: The Faithful Slave in Twentieth-
                                               
34 Hortense J. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Diacritics 
17, no. 2 (1987): 67. 
35 My use of the locution “Black womanhood” is not intended to suggest that there is a unifying, 
overarching “form” or “essence” that connects the plural experiences of Black women across time 
and space. Rather, the locution endeavors to accent the production of such a unifying substance 
and its ascription to Black women through practices of racialization and subordination of which 
minstrelsy is paradigmatic. This universalizing substance is a condition for the making-machine of 
Black women, as I will subsequently argue. 
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Century America, McElya endeavors to produce an account of slavery’s histories 
that could explain how narratives of “the slave as a faithful and loving dependent, 
of which the mammy was the most popular representation, [came to] drench[] 
American culture and politics throughout the twentieth century and persist to this 
day.”36 The narrative of the faithful slave achieved its revisionist efficacy through 
the generation of nostalgia for a romantic antebellum South that never was; the 
veneration of the mammy figure represented a particular technology in the 
production of this alternative historical account. Although the forms taken by this 
revisionist propaganda were varied, McElya devotes significant attention to a 
theatrical scene unusually common at the beginning of the twentieth century—
white women engaging in “professional and amateur impersonations of enslaved 
[B]lack women on stages and in living rooms, whether for historical 
presentations, for shared amusement, to raise funds for favorite causes, or for 
pay.”37 
White women were arguably the nation’s primary producers and 
consumers of the faithful slave narrative (and its concomitant mammy tropes) in 
the early twentieth century. These women would author textual archives of letters 
subsequently presented as exchanges between women and their mammies; 
these letters, though written exclusively by white women, depicted a sentimental 
intimacy whose intensity traded on a fictive bond mendaciously presented as an 
authentic relation between a white woman and her loving mammy. Often, the 
                                               
36 Micki McElya, Clinging to Mammy: The Faithful Slave in Twentieth-Century America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 3. 
37 Ibid., 39. 
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retrospective wish that these epistolary narratives expressed—notwithstanding 
the abundance of sublimated erotic desire for Black women’s bodies dripping off 
their pages—was that “nothing could have been more precious to enslaved 
[B]lack people than their white charges.”38  
Just as these written manifestos shaped white women’s nostalgic longings 
for a return to the false history of the faithful slave, they would be unexpectedly 
shaped by these women’s experiences with segregation, war, and social 
upheaval. The primacy of textual production in the form of epistolary archives 
would give way to more substantively embodied performances of blackface 
minstrelsy, frequently in the form of racial masquerade and dialect reading. It was 
through the assumption of “the role of the [B]lack mammy” that a white woman 
was able “to reinforce her own [racial and class] status.”39 It was through 
simulation of the Black mammy, a simulation that was paradoxically regarded as 
more authentic than the fictional mammy figure on which the performance was 
based, that vectors of class, race, and gender could be stabilized during the 
tumultuous first decades of the twentieth century. 
The figuration of Black women as always already mammies is, in effect, 
the evacuation of Black women’s infinite subjective particularity. Its operation is 
intergenerational, moving through and upon the violence of slavery, segregation, 
discrimination, disenfranchisement, and social precarity. Dehumanizing 
abstraction produced the mammy figure, and, in turn, for that figure to mark the 
                                               
38 Ibid., 57. 
39 Ibid., 64. 
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bodies of Black women, this process of abstraction needed to again transpire. 
Rachel Alicia Griffin writes of mammification in a similar vein, positing it as a 
technique for the construction of stereotypical narratives of Black women in 
contemporary contexts that, when achieved, dissolves the specificity of Black 
women’s individual lives. Mammified representations of Black women in a 
purportedly post-racial social and political order, one in which Black women can 
ably accrue capital and widely experience the promises of liberty, are, Griffin 
piercingly observes, nonetheless “replete with [portrayals of] servitude, 
obedience, self-sacrifice, caretaking, domesticity, and an allegiance to white 
people and white culture.”40     
 
On the Question of Minstrelsy and Making-Machine.  
The mammy performances McElya scrupulously archives can be 
productively situated within the broader genealogy of blackface minstrelsy of 
which the racialized reaction GIF is a contemporary iteration. Indeed, Jackson 
develops an isomorphic argument in her “Digital Blackface” when addressing the 
diffuse mobility of racialized-cum-racist performance through the circulation of 
specific reaction GIFs. The minstrelizing preoccupations of mammy 
performances,  though formalistically different from racialized reaction GIFs and 
ostensibly oriented toward unrelated ends, cannot be adequately scrutinized 
without querying their constitutive connection to the latter—as well as the 
                                               
40 Rachel Alicia Griffin, “Olivia Pope as Problematic and Paradoxical: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Scandal’s ‘Mammification,’” in Feminist Theory and Pop Culture, ed. A. Trier-Bienek (Rotterdam: 
Sense Publishes, 2015), 36. 
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constitutive connection of blackface minstrelsy to the notion of the machine. The 
histories of American slavery and plantation economies, suggests Louis Chude-
Sokei, hermetically sealed “the relationship between [B]lacks and machines and 
expressed [that relationship] in performance via blackface minstrelsy.”41 Because 
Chude-Sokei’s brilliant exposition of the intertwined legacies of the blackface 
minstrel and the machine-robot is exceedingly illustrative of the argument I have 
been developing thus far, I pause here to offer a brief interpretation of his text so 
as to situate it in dialogue with the specificity of my own intervention. 
“The Uncanny History of Minstrels and Machines, 1835–1923” (“Uncanny 
History”), Chude-Sokei’s contribution to the anthology Burnt Cork: Traditions and 
Legacies of Blackface Minstrelsy, endeavors to exhume the complexly 
intertwined histories of race, technology, Blackness, industrialization, and empire 
in the American modernist era. This sprawling list of analytics belies the intensive 
interconnections Chude-Sokei nimbly traces between them; what begins as an 
impossibly broad and apparently irreducible conceptual cartography is shown to 
be a conductive nexus of overlapping, contradictory, and interwoven social 
processes. Parsing this dense core into its elementary patterns, Chude-Sokei 
isolates two primary clusters of meaning fundamental to American modernism. 
The first he terms the “machine aesthetic, [which was] produced by and through 
the West’s difficult and ambivalent responses to industrialization, and which 
would ultimately find its political and social fulfillment in an America that 
                                               
41 Louis Chude-Sokei, “The Uncanny History of Minstrels and Machines, 1835–1923,” in Burnt 
Cork: Traditions and Legacies of Blackface Minstrelsy, ed. Stephen Johnson (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 111. 
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announces its global presence via the language of inevitably, the language of the 
new.”42 The promise of industrialization in the latter portion of the nineteenth 
century inaugurated new possibilities of domination over land and the American 
frontier—that vital American reserve of the natural. Industrialization’s slow 
transformation of nature into industry, however, was greeted with ambivalence 
and frustration. These affective anxieties sublimated in the form of a heightened 
nostalgia for an American nature, imagined to be unadulterated and not yet 
foreclosed by the insatiable hunger of industry.  
The incongruence of this desire for an untouched natural with 
industrialization’s commandeering flow was symbolically transposed onto the 
enslaved African body, largely “because of the African slave’s central function 
deep within those very notions of ‘nature’ and nostalgia.”43 The presumed 
intimacy of the racialized (that is, African) body with nature, as well as race’s 
prominent role in the process of modernization and the cultural experiences of 
modernity, gesture toward the second cluster of meaning-making in modernity, 
what Chude-Sokei calls the “African aesthetic.”44 The contradictory plurality of the 
locution “African aesthetic” intends to gesture toward the multiply imposed 
“metonymic relationships between and among [B]lacks and their varied cultural 
products during and after slavery . . . [and how] these constructs ultimately 
manifested a complex set of relationships with [their] dialectical other: 
                                               
42 Ibid., 110 (emphasis added). 
43 Ibid., 111. 
44 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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technology, industry, [or] civilization.”45 Proper management of the anxieties 
inadvertently forged in the industrial crucible required flexibility between the 
categorical markers “race” and “machine,” “would require strategic moments 
when the two blend and pass for each other rather than function as the 
antinomies they did and still do represent.”46 Chude-Sokei thus writes: “In 
analyzing these two clusters and historicizing their fundamentally modern 
influence on each other, what we then find in the nineteenth century are two of 
the twentieth century’s most distinct products facing and doubling each other: the 
blackface minstrel and the robot.”47 
Much like the historical accounts of the mammy discussed above, Chude-
Sokei locates plantation slavery and its legacies as the source of blackface 
minstrelsy and the racist popular culture it would spawn. Prior to the “birth” of 
modernity, it was the plantation economy that “sealed the relationship between 
[B]lacks and machines and expressed it in performance via blackface 
minstrelsy.”48 The plantation’s regimented disciplinarity was a structural precursor 
to the formal, temporally bounded, and depersonalizing labor systems of Fordism 
and Taylorism. The automation of those subsequent systems of mass production 
was already visible in the plantation’s aspiration toward machinic, routinized 
production. It is therefore unsurprising, Chude-Sokei observes, that whites 
seeking to escape industrialization’s effacement of the individuated laborer would 
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48 Ibid., 114. 
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turn to minstrelsy performance in the form of an “always flexible and always 
performative ‘African Aesthetic’ . . . as distinct from whiteness and ‘the West.’”49 
Indeed, at the turn of the twentieth century, the contested position of the Black 
subject as neither human nor animal but something altogether elsewhere 
translated as a kind of liminality. This symbolic aperture came to incorporate the 
idea of machinic production as indicative of a machinic body, which was, in fact, 
not a “body” at all. To relationally experience that body is to be forced to address 
its signification of the uncanny, its machinic potential to colonize the colonizing 
white subject through the automatism it masks as its nature.  
Chude-Sokei’s turn to the Freudian uncanny as “the space of 
epistemological uncertainty and cultural anxiety where the minstrel meets the 
machine” is driven by the historical transition from plantation-based economies of 
enslavement to increasing possibilities of Black migration and labor 
diversification.50 In the context of American slavery and in the legacy of blackface 
minstrelsy, the uncanny inscribes the particular anxiety felt when a thing (the 
Black subject) deceptively presents itself as a person. During the era of 
plantation slavery and its (still) violent aftermath, “this slippage occurs when a 
designated thing dares assert itself as a person via mimicry of ‘human’ codes, 
thereby suggesting the capacity for reason, for literacy, and [for] kinship.”51 The 
liminal ontological position of the Black subject, agonizingly amplified by adaptive 
relations of domination at the turn of the twentieth century, was preserved in its 
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ambiguity through recourse to blackface minstrelsy and the racialized figures it 
congealed. Minstrelsy persisted in the effort to maintain the Black body as a 
capacious, romanticized, and romanticizing sign of an antebellum past, an 
industrializing present, and a technologically promising future. The cultural forms 
that dispersed throughout the beginning decades of the twentieth century, many 
taken to typify the modernist moment, deeply linked to that figure of the machinic 
minstrel, who would remain at the core of the discursive and economic effects 
that are American mass media and popular culture.”52    
The purpose of my extensive, granular mapping of the discursive 
maneuvers made in “Uncanny History” has been in foundational anticipation of 
my own argument. To briefly review, my claim is that, building upon Jackson’s 
analysis in “Digital Blackface,” the circulation of reaction GIFs whose content 
features hyperbolic caricatures of Black women works through the genealogical 
currents of mammification and minstrelsy to further alienate Black women from 
recognition within the ontological category of the human. To justify my positioning 
the GIF within these genealogical legacies, I turned to the diverse histories of 
those two conceptual personae, the mammy and the minstrel; in so doing, I 
sought to historicize the relation of the GIF-qua-digital-minstrelsy to these two 
figures.  
More pointedly, my objective was to propose that the mammy and the 
minstrel can be historicized in their relationship to and with the concept of the 
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43 
machine, whereby the transition of minstrelsy to digital or “technological” form 
was not seen as aberrant or discontinuous but rather as emerging within an 
internally differentiated historical field of the making-machine of Black bodies. 
“Uncanny History” tracks the braiding of minstrel and machine but does not 
address the figure of the mammy; the rich literature on the history of the mammy 
figure I examined, though clear in its connecting the mammy and the minstrel, did 
not address the figure of the machine.  
Read collectively, however, these diverse accounts suggest a thick point 
of intersection between these three symbols, one that provocatively attests to 
what I will call the making-machine of Black women. As I will argue below, the 
process of making-machine is the process of desubjectification through coercive, 
iterative submission to automation; it is a method by which a subject, one whose 
embodied particularity threatens the vitality of economies of domination, is 
stripped of her subjectivity, that is, the very embodied particularity that should 
guarantee the recognition of her personhood. The circulation of reaction GIFs 
whose content depicts Black women through racist hyperbole is a constitutive 
mechanism of the desubjectifying process of making-machine. Through its 
extraction of Black women’s affective labor and its integration of Black women 
into escapable, repetitive loops, the reaction GIF pervasively diffuses its making-
machine logic. Although attempts disavow the violent racialization the GIF effects 
often appeal to its hyper-truncated duration, it is in fact the GIF’s abridged yet 
endless temporality that is of peculiar importance to the dominating relation 
instituted by the process of making-machine.   
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On the Concretized Object and the Transversal Analytic.  
Within the abstracting processes of mammification, minstrelization, and 
making-machine I have discussed, I have proposed heuristics with which to 
evaluate the social relationality of GIF exchange that themselves appear to work 
through additional maneuvers of abstraction and reification. I note this to 
explicitly acknowledge the methodological problematic that manifests in 
consequence: The analytical movements transited by these heuristics hazard 
dehumanization and depersonalization in their own right.  
Informing this methodological risk, as well as, I hope, justifying it, is the 
critical promise expressed in Kevin Floyd’s syncretic exegesis of a queer Marxist 
hermeneutic in his Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism. There, Floyd 
offers a queered reading of the Marxist method of theorizing social totalities 
through his injection of desire into the dialectical movement of the concrete and 
the abstract. Desire provides a motor for the internal differentiation of an abstract 
unity whose subsequent reconsolidation resists a return to abstraction through 
the proliferation of specific, concretized social relations. As a result, the 
“specification of concepts and objects and the specification of totality [become] 
inseparable.”53  
What I understand Floyd’s queer reading of Marxist method to offer is a 
reminder of the imperative to maintain a taut dialectical relation between a 
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concrete object of analysis and the abstract social-relational totality to which it is 
transversally connected. Bringing Floyd’s insights to bear on this discussion, my 
argument’s theoretical foundation, situated at an abstracted, broad register, must 
now be subjected to the dialectical pressure of a concrete object of analysis 
against which such theoretical overtures can be evaluated. However, in the 
absence of that foundation, one that is informed by the diverse histories of the 
objects and concepts under scrutiny, such an analysis would fail to account for 
the very abstracting processes it seeks to reveal. Insofar as the concrete object 
of my analysis is the racialized reaction GIF, I turn to an example cited by 
Jackson as representative of digital minstrelsy: a “GIFed” scene from the popular 
reality television show The Real Housewives of Atlanta (RHOA).        
One of several television programs composing the Housewives series, 
RHOA follows the lives of several affluent women (the so-called “housewives,” 
though many have established, lucrative careers that seldom exist alongside the 
kind of labor the term might otherwise connote) in the Atlanta area. Many 
members of the cast, which has consisted almost always exclusively of Black 
women, have developed notable celebrity profiles, though none is arguably more 
widely known than long-term cast member Linnethia Monique “NeNe” Leakes. 
Leakes rose to the heights of television celebrity due to her multi-season tenure 
on RHOA, which remains in production. Leakes’ appearances on the program 
were recognizable for showcasing her no-nonsense, unapologetically confident, 
and endlessly witty personality. Like other reality television programs, RHOA cast 
members would frequently be asked to comment on the events transpiring within 
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their social circle in “confessional scenes.” Such scenes involve a cast member 
appearing alone and speaking in monologue form directly into the recording 
camera. Edited in such a way as to imply that their content derives from the 
seemingly extemporaneous, candid reactions of cast members to the segment’s 
plots, confessional scenes appeal to a sense of intimacy fictively generated by 
their formalistic elements. In such scenes, cast members are presented as 
expressing their most authentic and “unfiltered” thoughts.54 That directors, 
producers, other cast members, and crew members likely surround the 
“confessing” individual cannot be acknowledged; instead, the confessional 
encourages the willful suspension of disbelief, the efficacy of which is largely 
secured by these scenes’ frequent appearance across reality television programs 
and their adoption of the same formalistic elements.  
Leakes’ confessional scenes, known for their incisive commentary and 
seemingly frank observations, became Internet sensations, regularly the subject 
of “viral” reproduction and dissemination across social media platforms. These 
scenes underwent such frequent transformation into GIF content that those 
                                               
54 Minna Aslama and Mervi Pantti suggest that the reality television genre (of which RHOA is an 
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methodological rerouting proves theoretically productive, with the two ultimately concluding that 
the confessional scenes of reality television “an arena for simultaneously expressing the 
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charged with the management of RHOA’s branding created an account under the 
show’s name on Giphy, the online GIF repository. Of the many GIFs featuring 
Leakes available on Giphy (a search of her stage name, “NeNe Leakes,” yields 
over 1,500 results on the website), I would like to mention one particular 
confessional-scene-turned-GIF, created and uploaded to Giphy in November 
2015. This GIF features Leakes in a confessional scene, responding to an 
interaction between members of the RHOA cast. Leakes is seen irreverently 
throwing her right hand into the air and stating, “The shade, honey. I liveee [sic],” 
the textual transcription of which is appended to the GIF’s bottom.55 The putative 
intimacy and contrived privacy of Leakes’ confessional statement—functioning as 
an invitation to those in the audience to join her in a joke that, by virtue of its 
secret transmission, only she and they will be able to subsequently appreciate—
seemingly mimes the logic of the epistolary “mammy” archives, wherein the 
production of excessive emotional attachment, itself always conditioned on the 
privacy of the discursive exchange, became the guarantor of the archives’ 
legitimacy.  
According to Giphy, the GIF of Leakes, simply called “NeNe Leakes 
Shade GIF,” has been viewed almost 50 million times since its addition to 
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Giphy’s catalogue at the end of 2015. This figure, notably, does not include the 
number of times the GIF has been retrieved from Giphy and then disseminated 
through unconnected platforms (e.g., if the GIF is downloaded to a personal 
computer and then shared from that computer, this would not affect Giphy’s 
recorded number of views). The figure also does not represent the number of 
times the looping sequence itself has been witnessed. This is because, as Giphy 
explains, its view-counting mechanism registers a single-unit increase in views 
(e.g., from one view to two views) each time a GIF is shared (rather than each 
time it is shared as well as each time it completes its animated sequence). Said 
otherwise, an GIF’s view count is not affected by the number of times it repeats 
its content by virtue of remaining within the visible boundaries of a particular 
digital interface.56 Moreover, this figure includes no internally differentiating 
statistics about its use. That is to say, Giphy provides no information about the 
contexts of those 50 million views, meaning that there is no effective way to 
determine the sites of the image’s most frequent circulation. As with any brute 
quantification, the figure flattens out difference, and it cannot be assumed that 
each of those views was an instance of violently subordinating racialization, an 
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platforms and Giphy’s view-count mechanism, Maria Poulaki comments, the success of the Vine 
loop “does not—or at least not only—depend on spatial spread, [that is,] the number of people 
watching, but rather on the duration of views, that is to say on how many times a single person or 
end user ‘endured’ a loop.” Maria Poulaki, “Featuring Shortness in Online Loop Cultures,” 
Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 5, nos. 1–2 (2015): 94. That 
Poulaki portrays the scene of perpetual exposure to the looping movement-image as one to be 
“endured” provocatively gestures toward the internal differentiation required of any 
phenomenological account addressing the event of collision between a GIF and a spectating 
subject.   
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instance matching the context of GIF circulation that serves as the analytical 
backdrop of my analysis. It is entirely plausible and likely the case that among 
those 50 million views are countless instances of Black cellphone users 
marshaling the GIF to subvert its racially subordinating imagery. This form of 
subversive use, effectively a caricaturing of the caricature, must not be 
discounted as unrelated to the broader analytical queries my discussion 
implicates. However, insofar as my objective here is to root out and expressly 
identify the instances in which the circulation of GIFs featuring Leakes fortify a 
white supremacist order of things, I regrettably do not attend to this vital question 
of subversion. 
Returning to the specific GIF of Leakes mentioned above, I would like to 
briefly employ Giphy’s rigid quantification formula to consider the relationship 
between views and looped playbacks. The approximately three-quarters of a 
second the image takes to complete a single playback, when couched in broader 
temporal units, yields the following figures: in a one-minute period, the GIF 
completes its looping sequence around eighty times; in slightly more than a five-
minute period, the GIF completes its looping sequence more than four hundred 
times. In neither instance, however, would the number of completed loops result 
in an equivalent increase in the number of “views” associated with the GIF. 
Whether the image repeats eighty times or eight hundred times, the formula 
registers an increase of one in the GIF’s registered number of views, as “view” is 
in fact an index of deployment, that is, an approximate quantification of the 
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instances in which the GIF is retrieved from Giphy and shared through a digital-
communication platform.   
In brief review, I have thus far argued that the process of mammification 
functions as a constitutive social logic that can readily adapt in response to the 
maintenance needs of historically specific economies of racism. I have also 
contended that blackface minstrelsy, of which the early twentieth-century 
“mammy” performances are a central facet, was a primary technology through 
which perceptions of the Black body were successfully bound to images of the 
machinic automaton. The synthetic alchemy that wove together the Black body 
and the machine functioned to absolve a white-supremacist American social 
order of its grievous moral failure. That is, to assert that American white-
supremacist ideologies, institutions, and embodied practices cohered around the 
dehumanization of Black lives was to proclaim the logic of the necessarily 
illogical: How could the not-human ever be subject to dehumanization, be made 
to lose something “it” never had? Access to the very ontological category of 
personhood was contingent on the successful interpellation of an individual body 
as a person, of a human figure as figured properly human. This tautological 
politics of recognition coalesced with the alchemical production of the machinic 
Black body; the consequence of their imbrication was the convenient foreclosure 
of the any possible interrogation of the moral failure this political-discursive union 
signified.  
Thinking these two arguments together alongside the GIF, I would assert 
that the infinitely looping movement-image of Leakes’ grandiose reaction 
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represents a contemporary, discrete, and interlocking moment of the intersection 
between mammy, minstrel, and machine. The hyperbole for which Leakes is 
known and from which her celebrity derives becomes the means through which 
she is derisively caricatured in an endlessly repeating scene. Of the hundreds of 
GIFs whose content comprises Leakes’ varied reactions to the dramatic 
exchanges of the RHOA cast, dozens have view counts in excess of several 
million. In turn, it is not implausible to imagine that Leakes’ arrested dynamism, 
her quotidian reactions forcibly looped within an exploitative frame, her less-than-
a-second of living, has been made to repeat several hundred million times. The 
relationship Leakes may have had (or may be abstracted to have had) with the 
notion of personhood prior to this “GIFing” has corroded in its wake; the hollow 
splicing and reproduction of her most allegedly “outrageous” moments would 
seem able to entertain only in the aftermath of this infinite loss. This is the 
characteristic form of the process of making-machine. 
What remains, then, is first to interrogate the imbrication of the GIF and 
the process of making-machine, an enterprise situated at the register of the 
conceptual. Next is to weave the analytic yield of the former inquiry together with 
this concrete object of scrutiny, the incessantly proliferating cadre of GIFs whose 
content is the looping hyperbole ascribed to the persona of NeNe Leakes. This 
will also require a broader conceptual account of the GIF’s racializing, extractive 
mechanics. I turn to these questions in Chapters 3 and 4.      
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MEDIATIC SPECIFICITY, AFFECTIVE EXPROPRIATIONS, AND THE MAKING-MACHINE OF 
BLACK WOMEN: ON THE GIF’S PROMISE OF ONTOLOGICAL (IM)POSSIBILITY 
 
What does it mean to queer the Marxist dialectical relation between the 
abstract and the concrete, especially as detailed in Kevin Floyd’s Reification of 
Desire?1 While I have identified the queering of this Marxist dialectic as 
paramount to my argument’s efficacy, it is necessary to note that I understand 
the virtue of this method to exceed its recursive revision of the Marxist categories 
of abstract and concrete. To queer the dialectical relation of those two categories 
requires reflexivity not merely at the level of executed method; reflexivity is also 
demanded with equal force in determinations of method as such.  
That is, to work through the queered Marxism Floyd envisions obliges me 
to adopt a position of reflexive autocritique directed toward my traversals 
between the registers of the conceptual and the particular as well as toward how 
I delineate the very coordinates of those traversals. Floyd’s queered Marxism, so 
espoused, takes its concern at two levels—that of “method” (the dialectical 
movement between abstract and concrete) and that of meta-method (the iterative 
reimagining of the character of that dialectical movement which is informed by 
the diverse contexts of its employment). That is, to think the concrete is to think it 
informed by the abstract, and to think the abstract is to think it informed by the 
concrete. An analytical account endeavoring to explain how the racialized 
                                               
1 See generally Kevin Floyd, The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
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reaction GIF extracts its subject’s affective must therefore be foregrounded by 
attention to the question of mediatic specificity. To attend to the GIF’s mediatic 
specificity is to consider its technical constitution in the contextual historicity of its 
deployment.  
In their reflections on the materiality of new media, Steven Maras and 
David Sutton advocate an approach to theorizing medium specificity “not in terms 
of purity or as a norm, but precisely as a product of interaction between different 
elements in an assemblage of material processes.”2 These processes are 
material in both the technical and historical senses. The methodological impulse 
of a medium-specific analysis is a discerning sensitivity to the internally 
differentiated field of a medium’s emergence; its attention is carefully directed to 
the context of a medium’s production and the sites at which the medium exceeds 
the bounds of that enabling context.   
In the discussion that follows I offer a provisional account of the GIF 
filtered through the optics of its mediatic specificity. I turn to questions about the 
GIF’s looping function, representative of its style and form, to further interrogate 
how the GIF troubles the temporal fields in which it is circulated. Through this 
critical appraisal of the image’s looping sequence I develop an account of the 
GIF’s relation to the affective. I then consider the affectivity of the GIF as a 
question of labor—that is, as a question of affective labor. This theoretical 
exegesis will frame and orient my return in this discussion’s concluding entries to 
                                               
2 Steven Maras and David Sutton, “Medium Specificity Re-visited,” Convergence: The 
International Journal of New Media Technologies 6, no. 2 (2000): 102. 
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the racialized reaction GIF and to the relationship between the extraction of 
affective labor and the process of making-machine.  
 
Networked Looping and Affective Repetition: Sketching a Provisional 
Account of the GIF 
 
Extant literature providing a critical engagement with the relation between 
the GIF and the social can be loosely taxonomized as proceeding along one of 
two routes. The first cluster is broadly governed by methods reflecting a 
particular derivative of cultural studies that tends to emphasize the GIF’s 
potential for communicative multiplicity without attendant regard to the image’s 
materiality and its concomitant specificity.3 The second cluster, reflective of a 
subset of media studies whose impulses include media archaeology, network 
theory, and deep focus on technical specificity, privileges the particularity of the 
GIF as a digital medium in its examinations. My purpose here will not be to argue 
in favor of one method or the other; instead, I illuminate the potentials and 
insufficiencies of each, thereby sharpening the methodological form of my own 
analysis and its possibilities. Ultimately, the method I pursue cannot be classified 
as either cultural studies or media studies. Moving through the overlapping and 
                                               
3 My critique of a certain brand of cultural studies frameworks, which reads with suspicion their 
unproblematized embrace of unfettered choice, possibility, and opportunity, resonates with Kane 
Race’s powerful diagnosis of the assimilation of some versions of cultural studies into a 
marketized, consumer-capitalist logic. In Pleasure Consuming Medicine, Race recalls that 
“cultural studies of pleasure and resistance have been criticized for providing too optimistic a 
celebration of [popular culture vis-à-vis consumption], in effect reproducing voluntaristic and 
populist accounts of liberation that sound all too suspiciously like the individualizing dreams of the 
market.” Kane Race, Pleasure Consuming Medicine: The Queer Politics of Drugs (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 74. It is toward this subsidiary, what Race describes as a “cultural 
studies of pleasure and resistance,” that my critique is oriented.   
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conflicting domains of medium specificity, discursive formations, and theories of 
the affective, I propose an account of the GIF emphasizing the relationship of its 
looping form to the ossification of particular economies of affect as a way to 
address the image’s medium specificity as formed by and formative of its social 
and historical context—including those of violent racialization. More specifically, 
the form of affect I connect to the loop is that of affective labor.  
 
A “Cultural Studies” Approach to the GIF: Decontextualization and the Question 
of Emancipation. 
 
The disarticulation of the GIF from its source, so this genre of cultural 
studies argument goes, radically ensures that the image’s content will exceed the 
boundaries of its imposed meaning. Through an excision that transcends the 
boundedness of its origin, the GIF scrambles whatever semiotic stability had 
cohered at the scene of its production, and generated instead is a theatre of 
immanently polysemic contextual exchange. The GIF’s capacity to signify 
otherwise thus marks what is exemplary about its potential as a technology of 
resistance. If, however, the GIF’s potential for resistant signification is tied to its 
deployment in situations that “exceed the boundaries” of its origin, then nearly 
every instance of the image’s (re)deployment—insofar as each instance of 
deployment represents an event, a moment of irreducible difference—would 
seemingly activate this subversive capacity. Demarcating the GIF’s origin with 
such molecular specificity, as these arguments implicitly do, yields a constitutive 
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“outside,” one whose effective infinitude fetishizes any instance of GIF circulation 
as always already resisting a normative order.4 
In accounts that too readily embrace the GIF as a harbinger of resistance, 
the relationship of the GIF’s material specificity to the analysis performed is often 
the catalyst of logical inconsistency or obfuscating exuberance. Frequently 
detailed in these texts is a hermeneutical method that clearly acknowledges the 
GIF as a cultural text whose emergence as such is conditioned by its technical 
affordances and structural constraints. Executed, however, is an analysis that 
apprehends the GIF as a cultural text whose mediatic specificity is no more than 
the raw, apolitical stuff out of which the image emerges.  
Stated otherwise, while these texts certainly acknowledge the constitutive 
tie between the GIF and its technical structure as well as the merit of remaining 
analytically attentive to that tie, their corresponding analyses frequently (and 
likely inadvertently) relegate the GIF’s material specificity to an either 
depoliticized or pre-social (rather than co-emergent) domain. Their articulated 
                                               
4 For examples of statements broadly representative of an uncomplicated celebration of the GIF’s 
resistant possibilities through its capacity to exceed the signifying boundaries of the image’s 
origin, see Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing the Cultural 
Significance of the Animated GIF,” Social Media + Society 3, no. 3 (2017): 2 (“[M]alleability and 
versatility are key to the GIF’s capacity for interpretive flexibility; the separation of GIFs from their 
original texts imbues them with multiple layers of meaning that are not universally accessible to 
all audiences . . . [and] provides the GIF with resistant potential: similar to double-entendre, 
parody, [and] other types of layered texts, GIFs can be (and often are) used to communicate 
hidden meanings in plain sight.”); James Ash, “Sensation, Networks, and the GIF: Toward an 
Allotropic Account of Affect,” in Networked Affect, ed. Ken Hillis, Susanna Paasonen, and Michael 
Petit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 122 (“GIFs thereby demonstrate how simple forms of 
technology can undermine the supposed control that the cultural industries . . . have over the 
content they create, for GIFs work only by exceeding the context of their production.”); Graig 
Uhlin, “Playing in the Gif(t) Economy,” Games and Culture 9, no. 6 (2014): 526 (“The enduring 
potential of the GIF as a format to resist [corporatization] . . . resides in the format’s low-fi 
technological base and corresponding aesthetic look . . . [which may work to ensure that it 
continues to be a channel for unofficial and user-generated cultural production . . . .”). 
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method is ultimately displaced at the site of its execution, with the promised 
attention to mediatic specificity languishing into a series of neutralized 
identifications. Often masked in these identifications are presuppositions about 
the facial self-sufficiency and political self-evidence of claims about the import of 
a medium’s materiality.5  
Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield’s “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing 
the Cultural Significance of the Animated GIF” (“Never Gonna GIF You Up”) is an 
instructive example of some features of the approach just described. Much to the 
credit of their sophisticated analysis, Miltner and Highfield conduct a nuanced 
reading of the GIF as a pluralizing signifier vital to the ecology of digital media. 
Nevertheless, their account suffers from internal dislocations caused by the 
division between the method proposed and the analysis effected—that is, caused 
by their promise to rigorously attend to the GIF’s definitive materiality and their 
ultimately unsatisfactory engagement with its medium specificity. Consider the 
                                               
5 To be clear, my point is not to deny or repudiate the sophisticated contributions to media studies 
enabled by cultural studies methods. Nor is my point that subscription to and adoption of certain 
cultural studies methods must entail a facile engagement with a medium’s materiality or, more 
inconceivably, an express disavowal of the politics of medium materiality. Broad generalizations 
of that ilk reproduce a category error whose difference is only one of degree from that generated 
by inconsistent attention to questions of medium specificity. Instead, I would like to direct my 
attention to what Penelope Deutscher would call the “suspended reserves” of cultural studies 
methods. In Foucault’s Futures, Deutscher proposes a hermeneutic of intratextual affirmation, a 
mode reading against the constructive grains of generosity and possibility, that provocatively 
marshals a text’s suspended reserves, seeing in what may be even “the most unpromising 
theoretical resources [the opportunity] to stimulate the emergence of new concepts.” These 
reserves are the sites of a text’s latent potential, and to mine them is to realize that “[to] identify 
the limits of theory is, indirectly, also to negotiate with the limits of one’s interrogation.” What 
emerges from that negotiation is the product of a productive tension between theorists and critics. 
Rather than mark theoretical endeavors as always already mired by lack, Deutscher espouses a 
mode of textual confrontation that is less concerned with antagonism and more invested in 
expanding the limits of any critical epistemology. Penelope Deutscher, Foucault’s Futures: A 
Critique of Reproductive Reason (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 5–11.   
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following excerpt from the article’s introduction, wherein Miltner and Highfield 
identify the conceptual and methodological presuppositions fundamental to their 
argument: 
In this article, we examine the GIF as cultural text and device. . . . [The] 
GIF has certain technical affordances that make it highly versatile . . . 
thanks to a combination of [its] features, constraints, and affordances. 
GIFs are polysemic, largely because they are isolated snippets of larger 
texts. This, combined with their endless, looping repetition, allows them to 
relay multiple levels of meaning. . . . In [what] follow[s], we outline and 
articulate the GIF’s features and affordances, investigate their 
implications, and discuss their broader significance for digital culture and 
communication.6  
 
The diagnostic promise of “Never Gonna GIF You Up” is an understanding of the 
GIF’s significance to digital culture and evolving communication mores routed 
through the distinct materiality of the GIF. In other words, the cultural meaning of 
the image format is the primary object of scrutiny, with the image’s technical 
attributes, described by Miltner and Highfield as the GIF’s “features and 
affordances,” shedding light on that cultural meaning (and thus in service to the 
creation of cultural meaning). The “features and affordances” the two mention are 
variously held to include the image’s “duration, color, and repetition,” its “lack of 
sound or playback options,” and the “versatility” of its file format.7 The enabling 
circumscriptions of these “features and affordances” are, per Miltner and 
Highfield, critical to the most frequent applications of the GIF: “the performance 
of affect; the relationship between polysemy, decontextualization, and repetition; 
and the demonstration of cultural knowledge.”8  
                                               
6 Miltner and Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up,” 4–5 (emphasis added). 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 Ibid. 
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Curiously, in their respective discussions of the GIF’s most visible patterns 
of application, Miltner and Highfield seldom think through the image’s distinctive 
materiality beyond its reduction to semantic content. For example, the two rightly 
recognize that the image’s resignifying potential is a contingent byproduct of its 
“perpetual embedding and re-embedding” in new conversations. The capacity to 
move seamlessly across digital platforms, however, is claimed to “highlight the 
content’s malleability,” that is, the malleability of the GIF’s representational 
prowess, rather than the malleability afforded by the medium in its singularity. 
This critical appraisal of the Milter and Highfield’s diagnostic language may seem 
politically inconsequential. Indeed, it may even seem that I am arguing for a more 
rigid distinction between “form” and “substance.” That, however, is assuredly not 
my purpose. I am instead arguing for a more nuanced attention to the imbricated, 
reciprocally generative relationship shared by form and substance. Rather than 
subsume one into the other (and thereby efface the productive tensions 
engendered by the meeting of form and substance), I wish to suspend form—
here, approximately akin to the GIF’s medium specificity—and substance—here, 
approximately akin to the GIF’s representational content—in a taut relation that 
resists passage into a dialectical synthesis, making two into one and difference 
into sameness. When Miltner and Highfield assert that the meaning the GIF 
constructs is “based not just on [its] content . . . but also on the surrounding 
factors (captions, messages, and the like), which provide additional context and 
layers for interpretation,” the GIF’s materiality, what marks it as a distinctive 
digital medium, is diminished to the apolitical circuitry of semantic transmission.  
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The reduction of the image’s mediatic specificity to the discursively neutral 
means of content signification appears again in the text’s discussion of the loop. 
There, Miltner and Highfield remark that the 
looping experience of the GIF on social media can last for any number of 
iterations (full or partial), and the variable length of the loop allows it to 
create new emphasis and meaning . . . . This allows the GIF to feature a 
new, self-contained narrative, separate to the longer sequence from which 
the loop is sourced: an individual GIF can provide set-up and resolution, 
punch line and affect, or indeed play with these dynamics to continually 
deny the viewer a denouement.9 
 
In their account of the GIF’s loop, what may be regarded as the characteristic 
hallmark of the digital image genre and the consummate particularity of its 
technical affordance, the loop is exclusively rendered as a means to create and 
communicate narrative. Miltner and Highfield take the force of the GIF’s repetition 
as the continuously accreting power of narrative display, where such repetition is 
part of the GIF’s meaning-making prowess—“in content as well as form.” That 
form has been reduced to content, that the materiality of the GIF is portrayed 
raw, pre-discursive stuff onto which representational practices are projected, 
marks the fundamental aporia of Miltner and Highfield’s account. 
At stake, then, in my review of the methodological bodies through which 
interpretations of the GIF have been produced, is how an account of the GIF’s 
meaning-making capacity should proceed such that the articulated account 
neither denies nor privileges substance or form, neither content nor material 
specificity. How, though, to think about the making of meaning? And how should 
                                               
9 Ibid., 6. 
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the meaning making be understood to congeal around certain representative 
practices, such as the racialized reaction GIF, a signifier somehow marked as 
innocuous, banal, and outside the violence of racializing discursive formations? 
As a provisional matter, I maintain a position that meaning must be understood 
as made processually. That is, meaning-making is a process which transpires 
within historically situated horizons that establish the limits of that process.  
The relative felicity of the meaning-making process, which might be 
measured according to the expressive capacity of any sign or signs around which 
meaning is made to cohere, is, following Brian Massumi’s approach to the 
processual, a consequence of the iterative expression of complementary 
tendencies. “The coherence of a process,” Massumi suggests, “is that of 
tendency, feeding back on itself in such a way as to generate always another 
difference.”10 A tendency never expresses in isolation, however, as “the incursion 
of processually formative force always brings more than one tendency into 
incipient expression.”11 As a result, “tendencies compete with each other. One 
may dominate another. A given tendency may end up monopolizing the 
production of difference . . . [and] [m]any tendencies will fail to fully express.”12 
What enables meaning to cohere through its processual making, per Massumi’s 
exposition, is the intimate proximity of tendency and process he proposes. 
Repetition of tendencies may not proceed without the internal differentiation of 
                                               
10 Brian Massumi, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2015), 42. 
11 Ibid., 43. 
12 Ibid. 
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the process of which they are an element, but, even in the wake of this 
differentiation, the tendencies constitutive of meaning-making are driven by the 
social partitions they generate. Massumi gestures toward this interpretation, I 
would contend, in his characterization of a process’ reflexive “feeding back on 
itself.” The tendencies generative of a process—the process of meaning-making, 
as an example—always fold back into themselves, recuperating the integrity of 
the process and releasing the excess of their difference as the latent potentiality 
that may unravel the process itself.  
Massumi’s understanding of the reflexivity of tendencies to reconstitute 
the processes from which they emerge—and to which they are threatening—may 
be most clearly stated thus: “What gives consistency to the process is the 
tendential direction in which the formations possessed of it move together, 
across their tensions. Here, it becomes unity . . . a singular abstraction that 
exerts an attractive force.”13 It is, as Massumi eloquently narrates, the tendency 
of the social order’s tendencies to asymptotically press toward the continue 
coherence of the hegemonic formations out of which they emerge and into which 
they feed.  
For this reason, the meaning made upon the GIF’s deployment cannot be 
facilely regarded as an inevitably assured, formalistically variable expression of 
resistance to the normative order. Rather, the potential meanings generated 
during the GIF’s circulation are always inflected by the tendential logics that 
                                               
13 Ibid., 214. 
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suffuse and seep from the social. Economies of racializing subordination, for 
example, are both prior to and formative of the very scene of the image’s 
exchange. To blithely embrace the GIF as the quintessential technology of 
resistance is to disavow the violent social formations organizing the forces 
propelling the exchange of certain images in certain contexts. It is to approaches 
more rooted in media studies, a discipline that integrates multiple theoretical 
traditions through which it investigates objects’ medium specificity in the age of 
new media, that I now turn. 
 
A “Media Studies” Approach to the GIF: Medium Specificity, Technical Structure, 
and the Turn to Affect. 
 
Among the contributions to the 2015 anthology Networked Affect is James 
Ash’s “Sensation, Networks, and the GIF: Toward an Allotropic Account of Affect” 
(“Allotropic Account”), a meditation on the GIF thought through the optics of 
medium specificity and affect. I offer “Allotropic Account” as illustrative of the 
second cluster of approaches mobilized in critical appraisals of the GIF as a 
digital media object and a distinctive mode of communication. Such approaches 
recognize the analytical merit of considering an object’s medium specificity, 
though their forwarding of the mediatic object often obscures the particular 
contexts of its use as well as the particular social positions of the object’s 
subject-users.  
Ash endeavors in “Allotropic Account” to effect a departure from 
conventional perceptions of the GIF as “a mindless form of disaffection” by 
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foregrounding instead the image’s capacity to “actively amplify the potential for 
affect through [its] technical structure.”14 “[T]o understand the type of affect a 
media object generates,” Ash explains, “one needs to pay detailed attention to its 
material specificity.”15 With regard to the GIF, the image’s efficacious generation 
of affect is fundamentally “related to its particular properties and capacities as an 
object, as well as to its content, because its particularities as a file type frame 
and organize the types of [affects] transmitted within it.”16 The scope of Ash’s 
intervention is consciously circumscribed by his attention to the image’s mediatic 
materiality, which, in an endnote, Ash recognizes as seemingly detachable from 
inquiries into the GIF’s representational content and contextual deployment. Ash 
there remarks that “[w]hile the content of a GIF as well as its cultural context are 
key components in [its] affective response, the focus of [the] essay is on the 
GIF’s technical attributes.”17 
The theoretical overture undergirding Ash’s examination of the GIF’s 
affective potentialities is his revision of Gilles Deleuze’s notion of allotropy 
through the interrelated optics of sensation and affect. Ash sketches the contours 
of his theoretical remediation thus: 
[S]ensation can be understood as the rhythmic organization of organic and 
inorganic forces along with the transmission of these forces. Affects can 
be understood as the encounter of those organized forces with other 
bodies, an encounter which in turn shapes what these bodies are and the 
sensations they can generate. Sensations are constantly being 
reorganized through events of affective encounter, which in turn generate 
new sensations, and thus new contexts for the occurrence of affective 
                                               
14 Ash, “Sensations, Network, and the GIF,” 122. 
15 Ibid., 120. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 132n1. 
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encounters. . . . I define allotropy as the process through which a force is 
modulated and expresses itself as a sensation or an affect, and vice 
versa, depending on its encounters with other objects within a digital 
network.18 
 
Following Ash’s conceptual fashioning, sensations describe the multiply 
differentiating transmissions of forces whose organization and application enable 
them to cross into bodily perceptibility. When those forces transit between 
organic bodies, rather than between an inorganic digital object and an organic 
body or among multiple inorganic digital objects, they frequently collide, and 
these collisions are conduits for the production of affect. Deftly suturing together 
sensation and affect with the GIF as his needled thread, Ash maintains that 
“GIFs organize sensation in order to modulate affects and that these modulations 
are shaped by the technical specificity of the file types and networks through 
which GIFs travel.”19  
Admittedly, it is not entirely clear what Ash intends to conceptually 
circumscribe within the domain of affect (references to affect as bodily 
impression and to affect as emotional response are both present in the text, but 
no clarification is further provided) or how his parsed reading of Deleuze’s 
notions of sensation, affect, and allotropy can prove politically generative in 
contexts beyond that of his own intervention. Ash’s critical discussion of the GIF’s 
distinctive materiality, nevertheless, is richly illuminating, as it thinks the image’s 
short temporal duration, limited color palette, and capacity for infinite repetition as 
centrally constitutive of the GIF’s affective conduction. Because my argument 
                                               
18 Ibid., 123–24.  
19 Ibid., 125. 
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emphasizes the GIF’s abrupt temporality and looping capacity, I briefly consider 
Ash’s reflections on each. 
Ash attributes to the GIF’s short duration a crucial significance to its 
conduction of sensations then modulated into affects. As I have mentioned, a 
GIF’s animation time is generally short, lasting for a few seconds before looping 
back to the first frame of its content. The endless repetition of content, he posits, 
enables viewers to direct their attention to forces beyond those organizing the 
GIF’s truncated narrative display. Thus, contrary to the conclusion drawn by 
Miltner and Highfield (and by the “cultural studies” cluster more broadly), Ash 
claims that attention to “how the GIF communicates sensation and generates 
affect . . . suggests that its power to amuse or excite cannot entirely be reduced 
to the arbitrary narrative that [a viewer] may apply to the images themselves.”20  
This refusal of narrative submission is, for Ash, an enabling and politically 
promising consequence of the GIF’s technical limitations, which require that the 
image’s file size remains small. Problematically, however, his diagnostic 
appraisal of the GIF’s contracted temporality imputes a presupposed abstracted 
universality to the image’s content, such that the GIF’s technical limitations will 
inevitably produce an experientially selfsame encounter among viewers. Ash 
opines that the technical limitations on the image’s file size “mean that in all GIFs 
the action shown is necessarily removed from a broader context that would give 
the viewer clues about its original source . . . [explaining why] one of the first 
                                               
20 Ibid., 126. 
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questions often asked about a successful or popular GIF is, ‘Where did it come 
from?’”21 Setting aside whether inquiries about origins are actually among the 
“first questions” asked about a widely circulated GIF (Ash offers no justification or 
citation in support of his observation), Lauren Michele Jackson’s incisive 
repudiation of racialized reaction GIFs and digital blackface, discussed in her 
“We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs” (“Digital Blackface”), 
is premised on the existence of a mutually intelligible racially subordinating 
politics of recognition.22 In the scenes Jackson critiques, it is altogether unlikely 
that the exchange of a hyperbolically racializing GIF is followed by an inquiry into 
its textual origin, as that question is always already answered by that racializing 
politics of recognition. The origin of the GIF, the transformation of a scene into a 
compressed file that maniacally repeats each and every second that it is visible, 
as well as the very impulse to excise that series of frames from its originating 
source, is an immanently operative racism, a mobile configuration of dominating 
relations that secures the intelligibility of the GIF’s racialized caricature even if its 
“originating” text is unknown.  
Ash’s “Allotropic Affect” is beset by a similar analytic deficiency in its 
discussion of the GIF’s capacity to automatically loop its content. Opining that the 
image’s looping nature “leaves [its] ‘before’ and ‘after’ . . . tantalizingly beyond . . 
. reach,” Ash derivatively reasons that unless viewers are able to “find the source 
                                               
21 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
22 See generally Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction 
GIFs,” Teen Vogue, August 2, 2017, https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-
gifs. For my discussion of Jackson’s text and the mapping of her argument I propose, see 
Chapter 2. 
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material from which the GIF was drawn, [they] can only guess at what goes on in 
the full clip.”23 The immanence of the curiosity felt by those who encounter a GIF 
but cannot identify its origin appears as inherent for Ash as the GIF’s irreducibility 
to narrativization. Moreover, this internally latent curiosity is inevitably “amplified 
by the contextual clues that may be partially visible at the beginning or end of a 
loop. . . . [But, with] no simply way of stopping [it], one can only concentrate and 
try to catch sight of a recognizable object.”24 The incomprehensibility Ash 
postulates as the overwhelming nature of the encounter between GIF and 
viewer, haphazardly extensive in its reach, yields the observation that “one 
cannot be sure of the particular emotional response that might arise in any single 
viewer’s body when watching an animated GIF before [that response] actually 
takes place.”25  
From the presumed incomprehensibility of the GIF’s content to that 
content’s constant production as an object fully demarcated from the viewing 
subject, an undeniable motif of objectification runs through Ash’s meditation on 
the GIF’s capacity for repetition. Indeed, Ash seemingly locates the hypnotic 
allure of the loop in a dialectic of Hegelian recognition, the pleasure of which is 
                                               
23 Ash, “Sensations, Network, and the GIF,” 129. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 130. In a curious final gesture, Ash concludes his substantive analysis with a statement 
whose juxtaposition to the preceding discussion offers a noticeable contrast. After variably 
arguing that the affects potentially conducted by a GIF’s circulation resist predetermination, Ash 
closes the text’s main body with the “fact that popular GIFs proliferate and become [I]nternet 
memes suggests that while the affects they generate are not assured, the organization of 
sensation can and does produce equivalent affects in multiple viewers.” Ibid. Ash provides no 
further explanation on the point, though the rhetoric of uncertainty and chance that tonally orients 
the utterance suggests one reason why its implications are not pursued. I return to this statement 
in my subsequent discussion and speculate there on this peculiar addition.  
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derived from the foreclosure of synthetic resolution. The viewing subject can only 
“try to catch sight of a recognizable object,” a process already embedded within a 
horizon saturated by a potential for failure.26 Even if the GIF’s content is of the 
humanly embodied other, that the image is circulated for subjects to view 
indelibly marks its content as object. After all, what necessarily precludes the 
viewer from accurately guessing—or properly recognizing—the “before” and 
“after” of the spliced GIF? Do GIFs containing footage of police brutality against 
Black persons not follow a disturbingly murderous script, one whose “before” and 
“after” could be succinctly narrated by any individual who has been made 
intimately conscious of state violence? For those already acquainted with the 
repetitive cycle of state brutality, inadvertent exposure to a GIF of racist violence 
may not incite the pleasure of narrative determination. Curiosity is not the affect 
amplified by a “‘before’ and ‘after’ . . . tantalizingly beyond” reach in this 
instance.27 Amplified instead is the hollowed horror that follows from the 
mundane saturation of the social worlds the subject occupies with endless 
promises of necropolitical adjudication. 
Although the insights born of Ash’s commitment to medium-specific 
analysis are undoubtedly valuable, they suffer from severely inadequate attention 
to the specificity of the social. To cultivate an analysis of the GIF resistant to the 
proposition that the image encourages “a mindless form of disaffection” cannot 
proceed in the absence of the social contexts in which the GIF purportedly 
                                               
26 Ibid., 129. 
27 Ibid. 
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evacuates the subject of its critical faculties. Accordingly, insofar as the exclusive 
focus of Ash’s intervention was on the GIF’s technical particularities—that is, not 
on “the content of [the] GIF as well as its cultural context”—it remains mired in 
the register of the abstract, unable to attend to the political urgencies of localized 
subjects and their worlds.28  
Necessary, then, is an approach to critically appraising the GIF’s role in 
the (re)production of the digital-social that transits between the registers of the 
conceptual and the concrete. Such an approach must recognize that the GIF’s 
distinct materiality should be thought alongside the particularity of its 
representational content across different contexts; its movements must go 
between registers of abstraction and specificity without presuming or requiring 
their synthesis. I attempt below to formulate a provisional account of the GIF 
informed by the methodological precepts I have just described. In turning to the 
GIF’s hallmark novelty, its infinite looping, I sketch a more robust account of the 
affective that develops through its constitutive tie to the repeating GIF and to the 
economies of racial subordination the GIF often implicates. Said otherwise, my 
analysis will emphasize the image format’s characteristic looping as the vantage 
from which a critical analysis of the GIF can felicitously move between the 
registers of media and cultural studies without succumbing to the deficiencies of 
either.   
 
                                               
28 Ibid., 132n1. 
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Looping into the Perpetual Present: The Process of Making-Machine as the GIF’s 
Temporal Order. 
 
What accounts for the uncanny spectacularity of the looping GIF? My very 
formulation of the question immediately registers an implacable knot 
approximated by this corresponding inquiry: Does the attribution of spectacularity 
to the GIF’s uncanny mode of repetition obscure the perverse banality with which 
the image is regarded? Or, might it be prudent to arrest the impulse to 
categorization altogether, thereby enabling the GIF’s potentiality as both 
spectacle and banality? If I appear to sidestep an interrogation of the 
experienced character of the GIF’s loop, it is only because what constitutes that 
experience is contingency, a constellation of virtuals whose actualization is 
determined by the multiple, antagonistic, and irreducibly dissimilar forces that 
pressurize the social. That is, whether the GIF is a site of spectacularity, banality, 
or an internally differentiating admixture of the two is governed by the contextual 
process of meaning-making. In much of the contemporary United States context, 
the conditions of late capitalism have aggressively hybridized the spectacular 
and the banal, simulating a lust for an endlessly progressive future whose 
habituation nevertheless remains frustratingly elusive.  
The loop of the GIF, I would argue, capitulates to a similar logic. The GIF 
appears to submit itself to that compulsory temporality of linear progression only 
to dislodge itself from that compulsive linearity through the loop. The loop is the 
cut which paradoxically returns the GIF to its inaugurating moment at the juncture 
of a future present. This return to the origin should not, however, suggest that the 
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loop is merely an illusion of movement. The image’s recursive spiraling within the 
relentless injunctions of progressive capitalistic futurity signals the recuperation 
of a certain tendential logic within the process of meaning-making. The GIF’s 
capacity for temporal artifice is fundamental to its dispersion as an object 
differentially and simultaneously situated as spectacular and banal. Such is the 
condition of possibility for digital minstrelsy through the racialized reaction GIF—
the “momentary” adoption of looping scenes of racist caricature as a technique of 
extensive self-constitution, one that does not demand acknowledging the grossly 
violent moral failures on which the technique’s felicity depends.    
What I am proposing about the loop’s meaning-making work is that its 
transformations of the social are indissociably connected to its reconfigurations of 
the temporal. By virtue of its mediatic particularity, the GIF’s animation is 
programmed to move “forward” only to move “back.” Its endless return to the 
origin contrasts sharply with the subject-viewer’s inability to return to that prior 
temporal juncture, that moment when the GIF was first encountered and began 
its continuous play. This heterochronic temporality occupied by the GIF and the 
subject viewer functions, per film theorist David Bering-Porter, as a “process of 
structuring the ‘now’ to maintain this ‘now’ in perpetuity, and thus to mitigate the 
shifting conditions that open up the possibility of risk in the future.”29 In his 
examination of the work of experimental filmmaker Martin Arnold, Bering-Porter 
discerns “something important, symptomatic, and unique about the temporality of 
                                               
29 David Bering-Porter, “The Automaton in All of Us: GIFs, Cinemagraphs, and the Films of Martin 
Arnold,” Moving Image Review & Art Journal 3, no. 2 (2014): 185. 
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our time” in Arnold’s hallmark techniques of exaggerated closeup, time 
compression, and scene repetition.30 Arnold’s found-footage films recursively fold 
into a choreography of intensive looping, a structural form of the movement-
image “now ubiquitous in contemporary digital culture” and paradigmatically 
exemplified by the GIF.31 The GIF’s repetition ostensibly collapses “the past and 
the future into a perpetual, chronic present,” and this reiterative collapse, “a 
strategy for eschewing change altogether in favor of maintaining the conditions of 
the status quo,” encodes a promissory pleasure through its transitory flouting of 
capital’s imminent self-destruction.32  
 The two methodological clusters visible in GIF studies I earlier described, 
one informed by cultural studies and one by media studies, maintain divergent 
positions on the relationship between the GIF and narrative. The cultural studies 
approach holds that the GIF’s circumscribed form transformed it into a self-
contained narrative, one that its viewers would attempt to understand by situating 
it within the linear teleological progression of narrative form. The media studies 
approach, in contradistinction, eschews the GIF’s reduction to an arbitrary 
narrative imposed by its viewers, arguing instead that the image’s non-
narratological elements, its incorporeal forces organizing sensation and affect, 
are the content from which meaning is derived. Although these two hermeneutics 
yield visibly disparate conclusions, there exists an epistemological motif that is 
threaded between them and which indicates, albeit implicitly, the substance of 
                                               
30 Ibid., 184. 
31 Ibid., 183. 
32 Ibid., 185. 
 
74 
their shared frame: both methods situate their determinations of the GIF’s 
capacity to be teleologically narrativized in the near equivalent of a contextual 
vacuum. That is to say, both approaches emphasize the subject-viewer’s 
experience with the GIF as a singularity, one that is influenced by the 
particularities of a social context but not subject to the tendential logics of that 
context. It is for this reason that Ash can assert in “Allotropic Affect” that “one 
cannot be sure of the particular emotional response that might arise in any single 
viewer’s body when watching an animated GIF” and then immediately 
acknowledge that the “fact that popular GIFs proliferate . . . suggests that while 
they affects they generate are not assured, the organization of sensation can and 
does produce equivalent affects in multiple viewers.”33 Ash’s recognition that 
organized sensations can produce equivalent affects in different viewers does 
not smooth over that claim’s incongruence with his prior statement, namely that 
there can be no certainty as to the affective response a GIF incites. What 
enables these claims to coexist as mutually intelligible and reinforcing is the 
misleading presupposition that the relationship between narrative and GIF is 
restricted to the subject-viewer’s experience of comprehending the GIF’s content. 
My argument here is twofold. First, I am suggesting that the consequence 
of the GIF’s looping capacity should be understood neither as resisting 
narrativization nor as succumbing to narrativization. To pursue either alternative 
is to restrict the relationship of narrative to the GIF to the isolated content the GIF 
                                               
33 Ash, “Sensations, Network, and the GIF,” 130. 
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displays, which fundamentally obscures the broader social processes, or “social 
narratives,” implicated by the GIF’s content. These broader social processes 
cohere through the convergence of certain tendential logics of meaning-making, 
logics that exceed the context of any singular GIF but saturate its potential for 
meaning and the possible sites of its deployment. Second, I am proposing that 
the interrogative scope of an analysis of the GIF’s receptivity to narrativization 
vis-à-vis the former’s looping capacity be expanded and multiplied. Such an 
examination of the content a GIF communicates must be positioned in a mutual 
dialogue with the social and the specific.  
Accordingly, when Anna McCarthy contends in her “Visual Pleasure and 
GIFs” that, “as loops, GIFs always start in medias res,” her discussion of that 
“certain desire to understand what’s going on [which] keeps us looking . . . to 
comprehend [a GIF’s] subject matter” principally misconstrues the nature of that 
desire.34 McCarthy envisions the desire to comprehend the GIF as a desire to 
make sense of the image’s “narrative” in ostensible isolation from the broader 
social narratives, or social processes, that delimit the horizons of the meaning-
making process. I am not suggesting that the GIF’s contents be read to efface 
their specificity; nor am I suggesting that the GIF’s specificity be aggressively 
foregrounded in its capacity to make meaning. Instead, I am suggesting that the 
subject-viewer who endeavors to “make sense” of an encountered GIF does so 
in a manner that transcends the image’s explicit narratological contents. Just as 
                                               
34 Anna McCarthy, “Visual Pleasure and GIFs,” in Compact Cinematics: The Moving Image in the 
Age of Bit-Sized Media, ed. Pepita Hesselberth and Maria Poulaki (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2017), 116. 
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the GIF’s loop positions its cycling in medias res, the subject-viewer’s encounter 
with the GIF transpires at the level of a macrologically in medias res—it occurs in 
the midst of deeply influential and orienting social formations, including, in the 
context of American sociality, economies of subordinating racialization. 
I would like to dwell a bit longer on the trope of “desire” McCarthy 
associates with making meaning of a GIF’s contents, a process primarily enabled 
by the image’s endless cycling of its content. McCarthy suggests that the 
hypnotic pleasure the subject-viewer derives from transforming a GIF’s contents 
into an intelligible communiqué is a consequence of the GIF capturing “that 
moment . . . when a difficult task is made easy, and not just made to look easy.”35 
Soliciting the pleasure McCarthy diagnoses is the endlessly repeating, elegant 
execution of the laboring act, the bodily gesture, the sensual pose, each 
suggesting to the subject-viewer that self-perfection is attainable and amenable 
to reproduction. The relationship between pleasure and comprehension is clear 
and decidedly co-emergent as the subject-viewer examines the GIF, but the 
nature of the catalyst innervating the subject-viewer to make sense of the GIF’s 
content—that “certain desire”—remains nebulous.  
Quoted earlier in part, McCarthy’s full address of this innervating desire to 
comprehend is as follows: “GIFs exude . . . to-be-looked-at-ness. In part this is 
                                               
35 Ibid., 120. Ash also appears to argue in favor of the existence of this catalyzing desire to which 
McCarthy refers in his discussion of the GIF’s endless repetition. His suggestion that the GIF’s 
looping nature generates a sense of “before” and “after” in which the subject-viewer becomes 
libidinally invested equally resonates with McCarthy’s characterization of an encounter with the 
GIF as in medias res. For Ash, this desire is couched in a rhetoric of curiosity, but the strong 
implication that this curiosity represents an object that the subject-viewer seeks to satisfy 
encourages its location in the same conceptual register as McCarthy’s notion. See Ash, 
“Sensation, Networks, and the GIF,” 129.   
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because, as loops, GIFs always start in medias res, so a certain desire to 
understand what’s going on keeps us looking.”36 My purpose in reintroducing this 
excerpt is not to fault McCarthy for leaving a determination of the nature of this 
desire open. Desire eludes precise definition, and to develop a full account of its 
nature is beyond both the scope of McCarthy’s intervention and the scope of my 
own. Despite this, desire functions as a clear conceptual signifier for the force-
relation McCarthy intends to describe, and the relationship between desire, 
pleasure, and comprehension McCarthy develops vis-à-vis the GIF proffers an 
illuminating counterpoint to the argument I have been developing. McCarthy 
remarks toward her argument’s conclusion that it is “worth stopping for a moment 
and asking what, exactly, makes these [GIFs featuring scenes of automation and 
perfected labor] satisfying.”37 Responding to her meditative inquiry, McCarthy 
advances an understanding of such GIFs’ pleasuring capacities as having 
“something to do with the spectacle of immediate mastery.”38 In this sense, the 
pleasure afforded by GIFs is “in line with all capitalist visual culture: it makes a 
story from the contradictions inherent in the system.”39  
How might McCarthy’s yoking of visual pleasure to the GIF’s spectacular 
display of mastery be reread through the alternative conceptual account of the 
GIF and its looping characteristic I have proposed? What would be made of the 
relationship between mastery, spectacle, the GIF, the durative present, and 
                                               
36 McCarthy, “Visual Pleasure and GIFs,” 116 (emphasis in original). 
37 Ibid., 120 (emphasis in original). 
38 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
39 Ibid. 
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hegemonic social narratives? The GIF’s capacity for meaning-making is, I have 
suggested, intimately bound to its reconfiguration of contemporary temporalities. 
That is, the GIF offers a comforting illusion of the present in durative perpetuity, 
an illusion that actively contests the turbulence of American sociality and its 
concomitant violences. This promise of the present’s endless return, perhaps 
even of a return to a prior present, one not yet adulterated by the dynamic 
vicissitudes of the social, is iteratively recuperated and reinstantiated by the 
GIF’s repetition.  
If the pleasure generated by exposure to the GIF’s repetition can be more 
broadly understood as the pleasure of making meaning at the level of ordering 
social narratives, it stands to reason that the “desire” to understand what the GIF 
can communicate is also a desire to ensure the calcification of what it has been 
enabled to predominantly communicate—those tendential logics constitutive of a 
romanticized, nostalgic sociality structured around racialized hierarchy. Thought 
in terms of the racialized reaction GIF, the pleasure transited by digital blackface 
is the pleasure of an instance of mutual identification. This is the pleasurable 
identification shared by the sender and the recipient of the hyperbolically racist 
reaction GIF: their mutual identification of a promise, however ephemeral, of the 
return of an American social order no longer “disturbed” by the “crisis” of anti-
racist efforts, a social order in which the momentary adoption of Black 
personhood does not challenge but in fact vigorously reinforces systems of racial 
subordination and racialized violence. This is the promise of the racialized 
reaction GIF. Moreover, it is through these GIFs’ circulation that this promise 
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remains disturbingly plausible, as their exchange fortifies the violent process of 
the making-machine of Black subjects. 
The process of making-machine, instituted by the GIF’s continuous replay 
of scenes of racist caricature and hyperbolic violence, is the ascription of 
machinic automation to Black bodies. When images of Black persons are 
transformed into GIF content, their bodies are forcibly conscripted to the cycle of 
infinite representational repeat; the originating site of the GIF’s content becomes 
less vital to the meaning-making process than the congruence of that content 
with racially subordinating social narratives. Digital minstrelsy does not therefore 
depend exclusively on the desire to narrativize the scenes displayed. Instead, its 
condition of felicity is its resonance with prior tendential logics undergirding 
economies of violent racialization and its fortification of those logics through the 
deployment of similar GIFs in similar contexts. That so much of the literature 
assessing the GIF as a digital and social object thinks it alongside the figure of 
the automaton should engender on surprise, even when the interconnected 
histories of the machine, the minstrel, and the mammy have been amply 
chronicled. Conceptually accounts of the GIF unproblematically invoke the figure 
of the automaton because their analyses proceed at the level of abstraction. The 
GIF to which these accounts refer is one whose content is so totalized as to not 
be content at all, and the spectating subject they envision at the scene of 
encounter with the image is a monolithic universal, an undoubtedly empty 
signifier. 
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The constitutive interrelation of the looping GIF and the process of 
making-machine, it should be noted, extends its overriding influence beyond the 
instance of interpersonal digital communication. At a site of dispersed digital 
communication, an example of which would be a social media platform, GIFs are 
programmed to display their content in a considerably different manner than most 
other animated image formats. On platforms like Twitter and Facebook, similar in 
this instance to the codified programs of cellphone text-message applications, 
the default setting for GIFs that appear on a user’s timeline is to auto-play, and it 
is frequently unclear how users can change this setting when not on a mobile 
device. When this predetermined preference for movement-image auto-play 
intersects with recordings of police brutality disseminated on social media 
platforms, the transformation of that footage into GIFs—the usual intent of which 
is to incite public response to these unjustified killings—inadvertently creates a 
grotesque pageant of endlessly looping, homicidally racist theatre in which social 
media users are differentially subjected to the process of making-machine.  
The diffusion of police-brutality GIFs has the paradoxical effect of 
articulating a demand for social redress as it ossifies the machinic representation 
of unjustly murdered Black men and women. Said otherwise, the social 
conditions these disseminated GIFs address—the precarity forced upon Black 
lives by a state that justifies its violence through implicit recourse to the notion 
that Blackness is incongruent with the ontological recognition of an individual’s 
personhood—are partially fortified by the Black persons’ endless exposure to 
their content. GIFs of police brutality serve as a horrifying reminder of the 
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traumas of racist violence through which Black subjects have been inaugurated 
into the social. Monica Torres, a New York-based journalist, recalled her first 
experience of unexpected exposure to police brutality footage on Twitter in the 
wake of the fatal police shooting of seventeen-year-old Lacquan McDonald: 
The default for [GIFs] on Twitter is to autoplay, and many users do not opt 
out. I was among them. There was no warning that I was about to see 
something graphic and disturbing, as there was on the cable networks that 
were also showing the video. The [GIF] of McDonald’s death was instead 
indiscriminately injected in between my banal tweets about Thanksgiving 
prep. Unmoored from even minimal context, the [GIF] felt cheap and 
tawdry, with each loop replay increasing some engagement metric, while 
righteously confronting nothing.40 
 
Torres here identifies what McCarthy calls the “fugitive temporality” in 
which the GIF emerges. McCarthy argues that GIF’s temporal habitat (or, more 
accurately, habitats) is resolutely paradoxical: “On the one hand, we encounter 
them [i.e., GIFs,] in the miniaturized durationality of the looped fragment. On the 
other, we encounter them unexpectedly, in the indeterminate durée that is the 
flow of social media.”41 The GIF agonizingly highlights the simultaneous 
uncertainty and perpetuity of present. Fashioned to operate in a continuous state 
of renewal through repetition, the GIF is certain to reset and restage the 
performance of its content—unless, of course it is displaced from the interface on 
which it materialized. In addition, one cannot help but pause at the lexical 
formation of “fugitive temporality.” As a linguistic marker, “fugitive” saw its 
greatest use in the periods immediately preceding, during, and after the Civil 
                                               
40 Monica Torres, “Instant Replay,” Real Life Magazine, November 22, 2016, 
http://www.reallifemag.com/instant-replay/. 
41 McCarthy, “Visual Pleasure and GIFs,” 114 (emphasis in original). 
 
82 
War, when the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 marked one of the many grotesque 
heights of American racism and the dehumanizing violence of the plantation 
economy. That the racialized reaction GIF may exist in a “fugitive” temporality, a 
time out of joint with the proper, implies the necessity of its domestication. This 
domestication is the violence directed toward those Black bodies conscripted to 
the GIF’s infinite loop; the traces of this violence are the machinic transfiguration 
of Black bodies, that process of making-machine whose dehumanizing 
imperative follows in the violent silhouette of the “fugitive slave.”42  
Whether by consciously scrolling through the history of a text-message 
exchange or by accidentally reloading the newsfeed on a social media platform, 
the spectating subject always brooks the possibility that some action will remove 
the GIF from its visual field. There is no promise that a GIF encountered once will 
be encountered again when, for example, a newsfeed is reloaded. Then again, 
there is no assurance that the repeated scene of McDonald’s murder will not 
unexpectedly resurface when reviewing conversations with intimate relations, a 
horror shared with the hope of reducing the trauma that its reappearance again 
incites. And, when a GIF does resurface, its equivalent appearance may be 
                                               
42 Grégoire Chamayou meticulously traces the multiple genealogies of seeking out fugitive lines 
for extermination in his Manhunts: A Philosophical History, wherein the titular practice, the 
“manhunt” is understood as the transformation of human bodies into objects of prey for those able 
to so subject them. Turning to the figure of the fugitive slave as the object of the manhunt, 
Chamayou writes, “Fugitive slaves, who could be killed with impunity, thus took the place of wolf-
men in ancient law, but in the framework of a different juridical rationality: they were chattels, 
objects of ownership, and as such could be killed at the command of their legitimate owner.” 
Grégoire Chamayou, Manhunts: A Philosophical History, trans. Steven Rendall (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 64. The reduction of Black bodies to the objects of a 
“legitimate owner” is a material practice of which the racialized reaction GIF is an heir as much as 
it is a figuration of the nostalgic “past” to which the GIF promises a (re)turn in the present. 
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misleading; the structural signature of the file format, after all, “is the malleability 
of its contents, [its] easy transmigration from one platform to another, or from one 
user to another.”43  
This language of malleability and seamless transmigration echoes Michel 
Foucault’s novel theorization of power relations in the first volume of The History 
of Sexuality. There, Foucault avers that power must be understood “as the 
process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, 
strengthens, or reverses; as the support which these force relations find in one 
another, thus forming a chain or a system . . . [as] exercised from innumerable 
points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.”44 That relations of 
power have no inherent, first-order form and no governing metaphysical 
substance marks them as contextually adaptive and always conductive; they 
crystallize in figurations as explicit as the state apparatus and as seemingly 
ephemeral as the GIF. Indeed, that the GIF can travel so swiftly, can move 
between digital ecologies with such ease, marks it as a relay point of 
Foucauldian power, one that transforms as necessary and works not through its 
spectacular singularity but through its insidious banality.45 
 
                                               
43 McCarthy, “Visual Pleasure and GIFs,” 114. 
44 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 92–94. 
45 This Foucauldian reading of the racialized reaction GIF as a conductive node in the 
contemporary grid of power relations accords with Tara McPherson’s notion of the “lenticular 
logic,” which she describes as “a covert racial logic . . . a logic of the fragment or the chunk, a 
way of seeing the world as discrete modules or nodes, a mode that suppresses relation and 
context.” Tara McPherson, “Why are the Digital Humanities so White? or Thinking the Histories of 
Race and Computation,” in Debates in the Digital Humanities, ed. Matthew K. Gold (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 144. 
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The Affect of the GIF: Notes on the Affective Labor of Looping. 
Toward a Provisional Account of Affect. I have thus far claimed that the 
racialized reaction GIF draws its meaning through the implication of diffuse social 
narratives, particularly those subtended by economies of racial subordination. I 
have suggested that, through its looping animation, the GIF mobilizes the 
intuitive availability of these social orders’ tendential logics, an argument I framed 
through an alternative reading of the GIF’s relationship with temporality and 
narrativization. What my account has not provided, however, is an examination of 
how the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs works on, through, and alongside 
the embodied subjects facilitating that exchange, as well as how those subjects 
engage the meaning-making process through GIF circulation. Without an 
understanding of how bodies and GIFs mutually interrogate and generate each 
other’s intelligibility, my argument will prove unable to adequately address the 
material specificity of the encounter between GIFs and their subject-viewers. To 
address this lacuna, I turn to the affective, augmenting my discussion’s scope by 
forwarding how GIFs and bodies interface through the manufacture, 
transmission, and diminishment of affective resonances. 
It is useful to begin by returning to Monica Torres’ powerful meditation on 
the traumatic imbrication of the GIF and the scene of police brutality. Recounting 
her jarringly visceral reaction to realizing that Laquan McDonald’s murder had 
been spliced and transformed into a GIF, Torres writes: 
In its [GIF] form, the disturbing video of [McDonald’s] death had 
become a puppet show, and McDonald a marionette, made to rise and 
fall, ridden with bullets 16 times, then 32, then 48, and on and on. Unlike a 
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video clip, which is buffered by a lead-up and at least has an end point, a 
[GIF] isolates the most traumatic moments and continues replaying them 
indefinitely, without warning and without your permission. 
To be marked in this way in American culture—to be looped in a [GIF], 
to be put on display as “animated” at the behest of audiences—is [to] be 
racialized, othered . . . . For [B]lack bodies, being “animated”—a condition 
that [GIFs], by nature of their form, automatically impose—already marks 
you as other. . . . On an infinite loop in [GIFs], this hyperanimation 
reenacts the spectacle [of racialization] for our consumption, puppets 
made to rise and fall. . . . In looping, the larger context is cropped out and 
we are left with only the most inflammatory, most affecting moment.46  
 
I have excerpted a significant portion of Torres’ commentary because she is 
relentlessly acute in her recognition that the GIF generates the specificity of its 
meaning by drawing upon the lingering intensities and inevitable excesses that 
accumulate between, beside, and across the temporal registers it implicates. 
With each loop, Torres provocatively claims, “the heartbeat [of the GIF] gets 
louder and we get closer to believing the [GIF] is alive.”47 How, then, to think the 
pulse of the GIF, its im-pulse, that is, how its animating pulse leaves an 
impression on the bodies that encounter it, leading to their own sensed 
impulsions? Embedded within the idea that the GIF leaves an impression on the 
bodies it encounters is an intimation of excess or surplus. That the GIF leaves a 
bodily trace in its wake suggests that the force-relations constitutive of that 
encounter could not be fully recuperated by the social. I do not mean to suggest, 
to be clear, that in its exceeding recuperation this remainder becomes an 
autonomous substance acting “outside” the social. I would maintain quite the 
opposite: this remainder institutes the GIF’s production of affect, the circulation of 
                                               
46 Torres, “Instant Replay” (emphasis added). 
47 Ibid. 
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which partially shapes Black subjectivity according to the logic of making-
machine.  
I am interesting in thinking together the GIF and affect through a 
conductive hermeneutic attendant to relations of intensity that produce a quality 
of excess, of surplus, of something “more than” what an encounter was otherwise 
expected to generate. Intensities are akin to forces, to force-relations, where 
“force” is not synonymous with forcible but gestures toward “an impingement or 
extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state of relation as well 
as the passage (and the duration of passage) of . . . intensities.”48 In a dynamic, 
unfolding field of vectors, flights, and vibrations, affect reveals itself “as a gradient 
of bodily capacity—a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating force-relations—
that rises and falls not only along various rhythms and modalities of encounter 
but also through the troughs and sieves of sensibility.”49 Gregory J. Seigworth 
and Melissa Gregg emphasize one of the fundamental insights of theorizing 
bodily-becoming through affect as follows: “[T]he capacity of a body is never 
defined by a body alone but is always aided and abetted by, and dovetails with, 
the field or context of its force-relations.”50  
Because the brokerage of affect always implicates the body’s contextual, 
circulatory capacities, turning to affect as a theoretical interlocutor chances a 
more radical exhumation of “how bodies or objects may produce or experience 
                                               
48 Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” in The Affect Theory 
Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 1 
(emphasis in original). 
49 Ibid., 2. 
50 Ibid., 3.  
 
87 
intensity as they pass from one state to another . . . [within] complex networks of 
people and machines and assemblages of interaction and cohabitation.”51 
Implied by this statement, which opens the first chapter of the 2015 anthology 
Networked Affect, is the possibility of seeing what was otherwise rendered 
unseeable through attention to the affective. That is, what may be realized by the 
careful tracing of affective circulations is an account of the transitions of bodies 
and objects—of bodies into objects, of objects into bodies, where “object” 
references a constructed category that is the result of an objectifying process. 
Precipitated by the shuttling of affective intensities as well as generative of those 
intensities, these changes track are emblematic of the torqueing of Black 
subjectivity effected by the process of making-machine. The intimate connection 
of the GIF as techno-affective site and the contingency of the subject is 
highlighted by Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska, who astutely state, “It is not 
simply the case that ‘we’—that is, autonomously existing humans—live in a 
complex technological environment that we can manage, control, and use. 
Rather, we are—physically and hence ontologically—part of that technological 
environment, and it makes no more sense to talk of us using it, than it does of it 
using us.”52 
Accordingly, to think the affective is to think the contingency of relationality 
and becoming. The idea of affect, which is not reducible to emotion, to feeling, or 
                                               
51 Susanna Paasonen, Ken Hillis, and Michael Petit, “Introduction: Networks of Transmission: 
Intensity, Sensation, Value,” in Networked Affect, ed. Ken Hillis, Susanna Paasonen, and Michael 
Petit (Cambrdige, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 1–2.  
52 Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska, Life after New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 13 (emphasis in original). 
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to physical impingement, involves an investigation of the transitional as well as of 
the circuitry through which transitions are channeled. I do not propose a notion of 
affect that can operate as a preexisting, self-contained heuristic. Nor is affect a 
sieve through which an object of scrutiny may be filtered in order to reach some 
theoretically consonant end. To think through the affective is to propose a 
methodological posture that is sensitive to the ephemera of experience, the 
transmission of sensations that elude conscious perception, and the accretion of 
forces that fortify the tendential logics of the social. Ultimately, then, to 
conceptualize with and through affect is to open one’s analysis to an emergent 
critical mode, as the constitutive resonances of the affective materialize in 
tandem with the object under investigation. 
Affect and Its Labor. The relationship between the GIF, affect, and the 
process of making-machine is one of extraction. To be forcibly conscripted into 
the GIF’s infinite looping is to perform simultaneously the heights of affected 
animacy and the troughs of machinic automaticity. The racialized logics that 
govern the selection of reaction GIFs seek out those representations of Black 
subjects that embody hyperbole and codify that excessive “more than” 
characteristic of affective intensities. When the racialized reaction GIF is 
circulated in an interpersonal exchange, the setting to which Jackson devotes the 
latter half of her argument in “Digital Blackface,” its purpose is to performatively 
generate that remainder which exceeds the social’s recuperative efforts, that is, 
an affective intensity. The nature of this intensity is drawn by the “more than” of 
the GIF’s racist caricature. The momentary adoption of the hyperbolic Black 
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persona represented in the racialized reaction GIF is the momentary charging of 
the body through the historical circuitry of minstrelsy and its racially subordinating 
effects. In the impression it leaves on the body, the affective dimension of digital 
minstrelsy experientially materializes the possible promise of a return to that 
romantic past of brutally enforced racial hierarchy (a nostalgic (re)turn that 
solidifies the intensification of a sadistically anti-Black unfolding present).  
But, what enables the conduction of this charge? What ensures that this 
remainder which marks the body etches into it a commitment to economies of 
racialized violence and their constitutive, tendential logics? It is in response to 
these questions that I offer a formulation of the process of making-machine 
through the optic of affective labor. Making-machine involves not just the 
perversion of a politics of recognition that refuses the commensurability of Black 
subjectivity and the ontological category of personhood. Making-machine also 
speaks to the extraction of Black subjects’ affective labor when they are 
transformed into GIF content. The conscription of Black bodies into the automatic 
repetition of the GIF is technology of discipline that extracts their affective labor 
to subtend the violent economies implicated by the circulation of racialized 
reaction GIFs. It is this extraction of affective labor that capacitates the charged 
possibility of digital minstrelsy and the adoption of Blackness through its 
subjection. Making-machine therefore involves two coeval processes: a politics of 
recognition that transforms the Black subject into a machinic entity as well as an 
extraction of that subject’s affective labor to undergird the dialectic of recognition 
described above. 
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Arguably the most influential conception of affective labor is that of 
Michael Hardt, which maintains that the rise of labor’s affective valence has been 
contemporaneous with the ascendance of capitalist service economies. What 
typifies current capitalist paradigms, Hardt contends, is the centripetally 
integrating forces of knowledge production, information systems, and 
communication modalities. Service provision has its seat at the core of Western 
late capitalist models, with labor associated with the industrial archetype of the 
factory outsourced to “developing” nations. Unsurprisingly, the dominance of 
service-driven economies in Western nations has resulted in the conspicuous 
absence of manufactured material goods, once regarded as the capitalistic 
products par excellence, originating from those economies. Because the 
provision of services through market exchange generates no material, durable 
commodity form, Hardt continues, “we might define the labor involved in this 
production as immaterial labor—that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, 
such as a service, knowledge, or communication.”53 
The production of services involves various modes of immaterial labor, the 
synthetic motif of which is the intangible character of the commodities such labor 
produces. Hardt goes on to propose a tripartite taxonomy of immaterial labor: its 
first form involves the informationalization of industrial production; its second 
form involves the manipulation of creative drives toward the development of 
symbolic representations; and its third form involves “the affective labor of human 
                                               
53 Michael Hardt, “Affective Labor,” Boundary 2, vol. 26, no. 2 (1999): 94 (emphasis in original). 
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contact and interaction.”54 Anticipating an objection to the idea of immaterial 
labor’s affective face, Hardt expressly notes that this labor is indeed immaterial, 
“even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible: 
a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion—even a sense of 
connectedness or community.”55 Essential to this third derivative of immaterial 
labor, Hardt explains, is its “creation and manipulation of affects. Such affective 
production, exchange, and communication is generally associated with human 
contact, with the actual presence of another, but that contact can be either actual 
or virtual.”56 In the final portion of his text, Hardt switches registers to devote 
further attention to his notion of affective labor, the potential of which is marked 
as coextensive with the field of Foucauldian biopower, “the power of the creation 
of life . . . [and] the production of collective subjectivities, sociality, and society 
itself.”57 The biopolitical production of conditions fostering life and enabling death 
at the localized level is routed through the circuitry of affective labor, and for this 
reason Hardt deems affective labor to be ontologically generative. 
Hardt’s narrative of the amplification of affective labor in contemporary 
capitalist production is not without its tensions. Perhaps most glaring is his 
argument’s risky entanglement with the production of monolithic conceptual 
frames, rendering a notion like “affective labor” concurrently too comprehensive 
                                               
54 Ibid., 95 (emphasis in original). While Hardt initially offers a bifurcated taxonomy of immaterial 
labor, he later divides the first form into two, thus creating the tripartite classification he identifies 
toward the text’s conclusion. 
55 Ibid., 96 (emphasis added). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 98. 
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and too abstracted. While this is likely the consequence of the text’s reliance on a 
historical teleology that weds technological advancement and social progression, 
I nonetheless find Hardt’s commentary to be importantly instructive to my own 
analysis. Hardt’s identification of the virtual as a generative site of affective labor 
is especially germane to this discussion, as is his provocation that affective labor 
produces subjectivity, society, and life.  
Expanding on Hardt’s reflections, I would suggest that the virtual 
possibilities of affective labor, particularly when it is socially commodified and 
capacitated to exceed the rigid boundaries of capitalist enterprise, are central to 
the meaning-making “work” of the racialized reaction GIF. Hardt underscores that 
virtually habituated services are as conductive of affective sensations as service 
labor performed in the “actual” presence of the consumer. Implicit in this 
statement, I contend, is the potential to shift focus from the recipient of affective 
labor’s production to that labor’s producer. That is to say, insofar as an individual 
need not be present in the “actual” to produce commodifiable affects, an 
individual’s virtual presence can generate affects even when that virtuality is 
conjured in the form of a simulacrum.  
Affective labor, as Hardt acknowledges, is no less subject to the 
exploitative logics of capital than labor producing a material, durable commodity. 
The racialized reaction GIF is able to successfully operate through the charged 
circuitry of affective circulation because it continuously produces and extracts the 
affective labor of the subject forcibly conscripted into its endless recursivity. The 
GIF’s loop, then, should be understood to do more than merely reset the scene 
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for another cycle; the loop is the linchpin of this iterative cycle of affective 
production and violent expropriation. With every cycle of its content, the 
racialized reaction GIF primes the virtual mechanisms of affective production. As 
that intensity moves among the image’s recipients, the extraction of the displayed 
Black subject’s affective labor fortifies the tendential logics of subordinating 
racialization as this intensive force-relation traverses from the register of the 
interpersonal to the macrologically social. Through this traversal, the Black body 
is manufactured as a machinic entity, something less than human and therefore 
unrecognizable within the ontological category of personhood. At the same time, 
the Black subject transformed into GIF content is made to stand in for all Black 
subjects, hyperbolically animated for deployment in the caricaturing racism of 
digital blackface. The extraction of the Black subject’s affective labor further 
undergirds this perverse dialectic of recognition, enjoining Black subjectivities to 
diametrically represent the most extreme displays of (in)human animacy and, in 
reciprocal necessity, the very impossibility of Black humanity. This is the process 
of making-machine. It is to this process in the context of the Leakes GIF that I 
turn in the concluding chapter to expand upon the making-machine hermeneutic 
and to consider its concrete interventions on Black subjectivities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE AFFECTIVE MAMMIFICATION AND LOOPING MINSTRELIZATION OF REACTION GIFS: 
A QUESTION OF BLACK HUMANITY IN THE DIGITAL OBJECT 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus, the second volume of their Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari develop the idea of the refrain 
as a conceptual apparatus through which to further augment their theories of 
social becoming. Deleuze and Guattari understand the refrain as a “prism, a 
crystal of space-time . . . [acting] upon that which surrounds it, sound or light, 
extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, or 
transformations.”1 Its function is catalytic, “not only to increase the speed of the 
exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect 
interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, and thereby to 
form organized masses.”2 It is in the refrain’s nature to become “concentrated by 
elimination in a very short moment, as though moving from the extremes to a 
center, or, on the contrary, to develop by additions, from a center to the 
extremes.”3 The refrain spreads outward from the putatively singular 
spatiotemporal site of its invocation, in a gesture that exceeds the limits of formal 
space (i.e., what is presumed to be constrained by interpersonal communication) 
and linear, progressive time (i.e., what is presumed to be the relationship 
between past, present, and future). It is not time, then, that governs the refrain; 
                                               
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1987), 348. 
2 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
3 Ibid., 349 
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“rather, the refrain is the a priori form of time, which in each case fabricates 
different times.”4 
The endless cyclicality of the GIF, the quintessential feature of the file 
format and a principal explanation for the format’s return to popularity, inscribes 
the GIF as one potentiality within Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the refrain.5 
For them, the refrain represents a form of repetition that facilitates the feeding 
back of affective channels onto themselves, enabling their multiplication and 
rhizomatic dispersion and thereby remaining resistant to the dominance of any 
exclusively linguistic model of semiotic meaning. To be attentive to the refrain is 
not to propose (although it is also not to unilaterally proscribe) that the lacunae in 
signifying systems are “empty” only insofar as they have not been filled by 
linguistic meaning in the primary instance. Rather, attention to the refrain 
emphasizes that there are modalities of becoming that language does not and 
cannot adequately represent or encompass. It is to consider the excess that 
escapes language, a form of which is affect.  
GIFs perform both more and less than what they ostensibly represent. A 
GIF will never fully signify within the limiting logic of signifier and signified 
because they operate through the refrain—that is, through the loop—and this 
operative mode situates it in obtuse relation to conventional systems of meaning 
making. This is, as some scholars have argued, the condition of the GIF’s 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
5 Alexander Cho’s discussion of the relationship between the repeating GIF and the refrain 
represents an elegant analysis that is exceptionally germane to this discussion. See Alexander 
Cho, “Queer Reverb: Tumblr, Affect, Time,” in Networked Affect, ed. Ken Hillis, Susanna 
Paasonen, and Michael Pettit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015). 
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liberatory possibility. As I have suggested, disproportionate, if not exclusive, 
emphasis has been focused on the GIF’s emancipatory potential in much of the 
extant literature. One purpose of my discussion has been to challenge the 
uncomplicated embrace of this emancipatory logic. 
What has been at stake in this project, on one level, has been the 
development of a theoretical hermeneutic sufficiently able to attend to the 
problematic of the racialized reaction GIF as a form digital blackface. More 
pointedly, I was interested in expanding upon Lauren Michele Jackson’s 
provocation in her article, “Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” that anti-Black 
racist caricatures, particularly those used to communicate hyperbolic emotion, 
constantly turned to images of Black women and femmes.6 In my attempt to 
develop that hermeneutic, I turned to the figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and 
the machine. I sought out their histories to construct a provisional genealogy of 
digital blackface in the terms of this project. This genealogy was one that would 
historicize the figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and the machine by placing 
them in the contextual specificity across space-times; at the same time, it would 
exhume their figural continuities which have proven perniciously able to keep 
them in a state of racially subordinating duress. I proposed the idea of making-
machine as a reflexive heuristic to further interrogate how the racialized reaction 
GIF functioned as a contemporary manifestation of the converged, intertwined 
histories of the mammy, minstrel, and machine. I then turned to the GIF itself, 
                                               
6 Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” Teen 
Vogue, August 2, 2017, https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs. 
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with an eye toward examining the object through the optics of medium specificity 
and temporality. I contended that a consequence of the image’s endless 
cyclicality was the production of an affective intensity that charged the process of 
racializing subordination effected by the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs. 
Making-machine, I argued, was the bimodal process through which a making of 
Black subjectivity as incommensurate with the ontological category of 
personhood was achieved. It contemporaneously engendered movement through 
a politics of recognition that transformed the Black subject into a machinic, less-
than-human entity while extracting that Black subject’s affective labor through 
GIF performance to provide a motor for that dialectic of recognition. 
Said more broadly, however, what has been at stake in this project is 
thinking the character of a methodology capable of resisting a certain act of 
violence recursively foundational to American sociality. This is the act of violence 
that radically dislocates Blackness from an ontology of personhood; one mode 
through which this act is iteratively executed is the process of making-machine 
subtended by racialized reaction GIFs. To conclude, then, I would like to turn 
these provisional methodological gestures toward an object cited earlier, the GIF 
of Real Housewives of Atlanta (RHOA) cast member and star Linnethia Monique 
“NeNe” Leakes.7 This GIF, which bears the title “Nene Leakes Shade GIF,” 
contains an image of Leakes tossing her hand into the air and remarking upon 
her enjoyment of what was likely a scene of her costars throwing subtle but 
                                               
7 Real Housewives of Atlanta (@rhoa), “NeNe Leakes Shade GIF,” Giphy, November 3, 2015, 
https://giphy.com/gifs/rhoa-nene-leakes-shade-3o85xtOGdvAAafXLe8. 
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unapologetic jabs at one another. Shared almost 50 million times, a figure that in 
all probability grossly underestimates the number of times the image has 
circulated, this GIF of Leakes typifies what Jackson acknowledged in her 
analysis: “Extreme joy, annoyance, anger and occasions for drama and gossip 
are a magnet for images of [B]lack people, especially [B]lack femmes.”8 But, what 
kind of affective labor is Leakes performing here? What are its consequences? 
How does this preceding discussion, which dialectically moved previously 
abstract inquiries into the register of the concrete, afford an understanding of 
these questions? 
If thought about in emergent contextual relation with the GIF, affective 
labor becomes conceptually bound to the image’s stylized display and mode of 
circulation. That is, the affective labor performed by a GIF—by the 
aforementioned GIF of Leakes, for example—is performed according to a 
process by which certain temporally bracketed scenes are selected for 
transformation into looping sequences. The selection of these scenes, in this 
case, a scene excised from an episode of RHOA, is not necessarily a function of 
whatever quantum of affective intensity the scene is presumed to generate. 
Rather, a complex, emergent, and multivalent process, influenced by factors 
such as the moment’s recognized popularity as represented in forms other than 
the GIF, the scene’s relevance to the themes and motifs of its original forum, and 
the scene’s relative intelligibility if rendered into GIF format, might result in the 
                                               
8 Jackson, “Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs.” 
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selection of certain scenes to be transformed into GIFs. Nonetheless, attention 
must be directed at what kind of affective labor the images already available for 
circulation can perform, and with nearly 50 million individual instances of 
exchange, the “NeNe Leakes Shade GIF” taps into a site of tendential logics 
powerfully resonant with American sociality. 
That Leakes is among the most known and successful members of the 
broader Housewives brand is apparent, and her popularity is in no doubt related 
to her particular method of representing celebrity. If the boisterousness of 
Leakes’ disposition, one of the traits for which is she known, might possibly be 
regarded as a performance of excess oriented toward stabilizing the tenuous 
circumstances of reality-television celebrity, what does this mean for the 
reproduction and dissemination of scenes of that conscious excess at a rate that 
approaches 50 million instances thereof? My point here is first to identify certain 
tendential logics of American sociality related to the racialized reaction GIF, 
which, in this instance, might include: the uncertainty of capitalistic gain through 
the ephemeral platform of reality-television celebrity; Leakes’ performance of 
aggrandized emotional responses to staged dramaturgy of “reality” television; the 
necessity of performing such aggrandized and hyperbolic responses if Leakes is 
to continue to secure her position on the show’s cast; as well the adoption of 
those responses via digital blackface GIFs by non-Black persons to “naturalize” 
Blackness as such GIFs represent it. Second, it is to interrogate how these 
tendential logics come to fold into one another and thereby stabilize the social 
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economies to which they are integral, including those of subordinating 
racialization.  
Leakes’ professional labor, itself dependent on the intelligible performance 
of hyperbolic affect, becomes doubly affective in her transformation into GIF 
content; the complex negotiation with racialization and its attendant violences in 
which Leakes is forced to engage becomes a durative conflict of submission to 
racialization, contestation of its terms, and the digital spread and flattening of that 
complex process. Through her virtual presence, one that spans multiple networks 
and digital media forms, Leakes becomes a celebrity icon but also undergoes an 
evacuating process of iconography. That is, she is made representative of a 
certain “essence” of personhood, but in her coerced submission to the 
iconographic modes of digital reproduction, the portion of that constituted 
“essence” that may have been recognizable as commensurate with the 
ontological category of personhood is placed under a profoundly hydraulic 
pressure. With each loop of Leakes casually throwing her hand into the air, the 
“NeNe Leakes Shade GIF” further impresses the iconographic process of 
making-machine. Reading the racialized reaction GIF in this way, it should come 
as no surprise that so many discussions of the image invoke the idea of the 
automaton—while too few recognize the imbricated histories of the machine and 
the Black body. 
In her cultural history of the mammy figure, Kimberly Wallace-Sanders 
states that the lexical marker “mammy” was understood as both the title and the 
name of an otherwise anonymous Black woman. The work of “mammy” was both 
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to singularize and universalize Black women, effacing and subsuming their 
differences under its avariciously capacious sign. Moreover, if “mammy” was 
every Black woman, she was also, as a necessary correlative, no Black woman; 
“mammy” existed, rather paradoxically, only because she did not and count not 
exist under the conceptual ontology “mammy” signified. Leakes is not the only 
Black woman whose bodily form has been commodified for GIF circulation. 
Indeed, she is one of many. However, if Wallace-Sanders’ statement is taken at 
its most literal level, certain questions become available. Under the frenzied 
reproduction of GIFs featuring Black women, a frenzy submitted to the logics of 
mammification and minstrelization, can any of these women be recognized as 
having a singular name, a singular subjectivity, a difference that is irreducible 
without losing the propriety of its claim to access the ontological category of 
personhood? How is Leakes recognized? Or, rather, does her recognizability 
depend on her not being recognizable at all? 
At the beginning of this discussion, I gestured toward the cellphone 
footage recorded during some of the most recent episodes of racially motivated 
police brutality in the United States. The footage I referenced had been taken by 
community members, frequently by people of color, some of whom had intimate 
relationships with those who were murdered. I noted that the steadiness of the 
footage, when read against the intensely violent horrors it was documenting, 
almost eluded belief. The steadiness was almost machinic, and it could not help 
but incite the dread of the uncanny, the sense that what is being witnessed must 
be but also cannot be a scene of interpersonal interaction. Such footage speaks 
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to the process of making-machine effected by the circulation of racialized 
reaction GIFs. Making-machine involves the contested submission of dynamic 
becoming to inert being; it requires disavowing recognizable life for the adoption 
of a simulacrum of near death. Black subjects’ self-production as machinic is a 
necessary, but, as is abundantly apparent, insufficient means to survive the 
brutality of the state as well as the racist violence that is foundational to the 
character of American sociality. Making-machine might be properly understood 
as approaching a paradoxical impasse of Black subjectivity, whereby submission 
to this bodily inertia effects the very reading of Black bodies as inhuman and thus 
unrecognizable within the ontological category of personhood.  
Within a liberal political context, ideas of broad representation are usually 
hailed as profound markers of social progress and inclusion. To be represented 
(without querying how the subject is represented) is the benchmark of liberal 
political efficacy. My efforts here have been to complicate such a narrative, to 
query how a seemingly innocuous digital object like the GIF can perform all the 
violence suggested of it and far more. This text has also been an exercise in the 
development of a reflexive digital ethics. To think about which GIF to send in an 
instance of digital communication may not be enough. To query the algorithms of 
their availability, the structures conditioning their possibility, the sense of intuitive 
justification that precedes their use—these are the ethical objectives this project 
has hoped to kindle. As NeNe Leakes remarks in the GIF propelling this 
discussion, I have hoped that this text walks alongside other solidaristic efforts to 
inaugurate a political and social context in which Black women indeed can live.  
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